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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to §78-2-2(4) Utah
Code Annotated and the order of the Utah Supreme Court entered herein on June
16,2004.

ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Are a hospital's factual incident reports, created contemporaneously with an
event causing injury to a patient, discoverable?

2.

Is further discovery surrounding the use of the Hospital's incident reports in
this case appropriate?

3.

Should the hospital be compelled to cooperate in further discovery
concerning the dissemination and use of its incident reports?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order of the district court declaring
the Hospital's incident reports privileged. The appeal also seeks a ruling and
clarification as to Mrs. Cannon's right to pursue further discovery pertaining to the
discoverability of the incident reports.
1

AII references to the District Court records shall be cited as "R.
Defendant Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc. shall be referred to as "the
Hospital." The Plaintiffs/Appellants shall be referred to herein as "Mrs. Cannon."

-1-

During the early morning of May 18, 2001, patient Gary Cannon sustained a
subdural hematoma from a fall in his hospital room on Unit 4C of Salt Lake
Regional Hospital. Three days later, he died from this injury. On the day the
incident occurred, incident reports were prepared by members of the nursing staff.
On December 17, 2002, Mrs. Cannon submitted in formal discovery a
request for "each 'incident report' and other documentation of Mr. Cannon's fall
during the early morning hours of May 18, 2001." On February 24, 2003, the
Hospital formally refused to honor this request, claiming the reports were
protected by the care review privilege found in UCA §26-25-3.

(R. 59).

On October 20, 2003, Mrs. Cannon filed a motion to compel production of
the incident reports. (R. 58-67). On November 17, 2003, the Hospital filed a
memorandum in opposition to the motion

(R. 68-89) and on December 8, 2003,

Mrs. Cannon filed a reply memorandum supporting her motion (R. 101-159).
After holding the matter under advisement for several months, the district court
issued its ruling denying Mrs. Cannon's motion to compel production of the
incident reports. It's denial of Mrs. Cannon's motion was based entirely on a
conclusory assertion in an affidavit of the hospital's risk manager that the incident
reports were "not created or used for any purpose other than for evaluating or
improving . . . health care." The district court stated: "in the absence to any
evidence to the contrary, this Court finds that the reports are privileged." (R. 174).
-2-

Immediately following the district court's denial of her motion, Mrs. Cannon
undertook additional discovery to test the accuracy of the assertion of the
hospital's risk manager. She attempted to depose the risk manager and to
depose all persons with information as to the identity of persons who had seen or
used the incident reports. (See Exhibits "A" and "B", attached). Mrs. Cannon
also served two requests for admissions and two interrogatories seeking
concession that the attorneys defending the hospital in this action had seen the
incident reports. The hospital refused to cooperate in any of these discovery
efforts. (See Exhibits "C" and "D", attached). (R. 339-344, 396-401). A motion to
compel is pending2.

STATUTE WHOSE INTERPRETATION MAY BE DETERMINATIVE
§26-25-3, Utah Code Annotated (1996) provides:
All information, interviews, reports, statements,
memoranda, or other data furnished by reason of this
chapter, and any findings or conclusions resulting from
2

This second motion to compel was submitted for decision on April 2, 2004.
UCA §78-7-25(1) provides:
A judge of a trial court shall decide all matters submitted for
final determination within two months of submission, unless
circumstances causing the delay are beyond the judge's
personal control.
Despite this statute, no decision has yet been issued. Copies of the briefs pertaining to
this pending motion to compel discovery are attached hereto as Exhibits "H, I, J, and K."
-3-

those studies are privileged communications and are not
subject to discovery, use, or receipt into evidence in any
legal proceeding of any kind or character.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Hospital's incident reports contain factual information recorded
contemporaneously with an event causing injury to a patient. In fairness, the
factual information contained therein should be made available to the patient's
representatives. In any event, the incident reports should not be declared
privileged on the basis of a conclusory assertion of the Hospital's risk manager
that the incident reports have been used only for care review purposes.

APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court's decision that the incident reports are privileged was a
conclusion of law (based on the district court's interpretation of UCA §26-25-3) which
must be reviewed for correctness, without according any deference to the district court's
ruling. See Rushton v. Salt Lake County. 977 P.2d 1201,1203 (Utah 1999); Taylor EX
REL CT v. Johnson. 977 P.2d 479, 480 (Utah 1999); and Truiillo v. Jenkins. 840 P.2d
777, 778-79 (Utah 1992).
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ARGUMENT
I
THE INCIDENT REPORTS CONTAIN CRITICAL
FACTUAL INFORMATION WHICH CANNOT BE
OBTAINED BY MRS. CANNON IN ANY OTHER WAY.

The incident reports Mrs. Cannon seeks were written by persons with first
hand knowledge and/or clear recent recollection of the event on the very day it
occurred. They are factual in nature. They contemporaneously record important
information such as when the patient fell, when and by whom he was discovered
and what observations were made concerning his position, location and condition
following the fall. They also likely include accurate reporting of when various care
providers arrived on the scene to begin assisting in the patient's care.
For several reasons, including prelitigation rules and requirements
governing health care malpractice claims in Utah, plaintiffs are denied opportunity
to obtain statements from key hospital employees until long after an event has
occurred. By then, memories have grown dim or nonexistent. In this case, Mrs.
Cannon has not yet been able to depose witnesses to an event which occurred
approximately 2 34 years ago. It is likely that when the care providers on duty at
the time of Mr. Cannon's fall are identified and deposed, they will claim they no
longer have clear recollections of what occurred when.

-5-

Although the patient's hospital chart has been produced, the entries it
contains relating to the decedent's fall are terse and in some respects both
unclear and inconsistent. For example, there are indications that Mr. Cannon was
heard to yell for help. The records made available to date are unclear as to
whether that call for help was heard before or after Mr. Cannon's body was heard
hitting the floor. It is impossible to tell from the chart that has been produced
whether Mr. Cannon attempted to activate his call button or whether he otherwise
called for help before the fall occurred. It is also impossible to ascertain from the
chart exactly when Mr. Cannon fell and when his fall was discovered by his care
providers.

II.
FACTUAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN INCIDENT
REPORTS IS NOT PROTECTED BY PEER-REVIEW
PRIVILEGE AND SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO
ALL PARTIES IN A MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE LAWSUIT.
Mrs. Cannon's counsel is aware of no Utah authority declaring incident
reports either non discoverable or privileged. Courts in other jurisdictions have
found such incident reports to be fully discoverable.
For example, in Bradburn v. Rockingham Memorial Hospital. 45 Va. Cir.
356; 1998 Va. Cir. Lexus 85 (1998), plaintiff sued a hospital for injuries sustained
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as the result of a fall from a hospital bed. The plaintiff there sought production
from the hospital of all "incident reports or accident reports" prepared immediately
after the incident. The hospital refused to produce the documents on the claim
they were privileged under a Virginia statute similar to Utah's peer-review statute.
On appeal, the Court determined that the incident reports were discoverable. The
Virginia court's analysis included the following observations and findings:
The plaintiffs contention is that these Incident Reports
are not part of the deliberative quality control process
and are not within the scope of the privilege as intended
by the legislature. . . . [I]t was never the position of the
legislature to extend a quality assurance privilege to
routine, factual reports which record the time, place,
date, witnesses and observations relating to a particular
incident. . . . [T]he privilege is meant to protect the give
and take of the deliberative process and the selfsearching review conducted by quality control
committees.
* * * *

The Defendant cites to . . . court opinions which have
held that incident reports such as the one involved here
are covered by the quality assurance deliberative
privilege....
After reviewing all of these decisions and the evidentiary
record established on in the hearing on the instant
motion, this Court continues to believe t h a t . . .
records such as these, which are standard incident
reports that are filed for any accident occurring at a
medical facility, are not shielded from discovery by
the provisions of §8.01-581.17 because they do not
rise to the level as contemplated by the statute of being
-7-

quality assurance deliberative documents. They are
simply recitations of the accident that occurred, the
witnesses that were present, and other objective facts
that can be ascertained from the eye witnesses to the
incident. As such, they are much more akin to the
ordinary hospital records, which are exempted from the
reach of this privilege . . . .
It is certainly clear that the legislature has determined as
a matter of public policy . . . that many of the documents
utilized in, by, and with quality assurance organizations
within medical facilities are to be exempt from discovery .
. . in order to facilitate the free flow of information
between staff personnel and quality assurance
committees. Although that is a commendable objective
and needs to be adhered to whenever the deliberative
process is involved, it appears to be an impermissible
reading of the statute to extend this privilege to cover all
factual reports or incident reports of accidents that
happen at a hospital simply because they are sent to a
quality assurance committee.
The basis of this Court's decision was set forth very well
by Judge Coulter in his decision in Benedict v.
Community Hosp.. 10 Va. Cir. 430 (1988), when he
stated:
The argument that all field work, the incident
reports, the questions concerning falls that
might precede a peer-review meeting should
be free from discovery... must yield to the
more compelling mandate of the statute's
last sentence. Otherwise, all documents
could become privileged simply by the
committee requiring their production or
attaching them to the minutes. As stated in
Johnson: "Almost anything could come
within such broad and limitless sweep." Id.
at page 436.
-8-

Therefore, the defendant Rockingham Memorial
Hospital, will be ordered to produce within ten days of
this Order copies of all incident reports that have been
requested by the Plaintiff.
(98 Va. Cir. 356 at 359-60)(emphasis added).
When a car collision occurs, the investigating officer generally takes
statements from all parties and witnesses. These are available to everyone and
are some of the first things obtained during the investigation of a case. When a
mishap or incident occurs in a hospital, employees of the hospital typically
document what happened through incident reports. These incident reports are
often the best source of contemporaneous information about the incident. They
are part of the hospital routine and are not part of the peer-review process. They
should be obtainable as part of the routine investigation of the case.
Peer-review or quality assurance committees exist in every hospital to
review, ensure and improve the quality of patient care. Those committees do not
exist to hide negligence. Recent decisions around the country have allowed
discovery of incident reports or other statements taken during an investigation and
have distinguished those reports from the actual proceedings of a peer-review
committee. See, e.g., Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation v. Eighth Judicial
District Court of Clark County Nevada. 936 P.2d 844 (1997); National Bank of
Commerce v. HCA Health Services. 800 SW 2d 694 (Ark. 1990); Cochran v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.. 909 F. Sup. 641 (W. D. Ark. 1995); Trinity Medical
-9-

Center v.Holum. 544 NW 2d 148 (N. D. 1996); Romero v. Cohen. 679 NYS 2d
264 (1998).

These and other cases illustrate the importance of distinguishing

between records and incident reports which are prepared in the routine course of
hospital business and records generated during the proceedings of a true peerreview committee. Many documents may end up as evidence in committee
deliberations; however, they are not privileged if the documents were "routine
accumulative information." See Barnes v. Whittington. 751 SW 2d 493 (Tex.
1988).
If a hospital were allowed to furnish all information concerning an incident to
a peer-review committee and then invoke a statutory privilege, it could insulate
itself from disclosure of all relevant facts except those matters actually contained
in a patient's record. Allowing a hospital to suppress the discovery of basic
information by hiding harmful facts behind the peer-review privilege would stifle
any incentive for advancing the cause of a patient's well-being - the very goal
peer-review statutes are designed to promote. See Mav v. Wood River Township
Hospital. 257 III. App. 3d 969, 629 NE 2d 170, 174 (1994).
A privilege should not outweigh the search for the truth. The Rhode Island
Supreme Court has aptly found:
In enacting our peer-review statute, the legislature
recognized the need for open discussions and candid
self-analysis in peer-review meetings to insure that
medical care of high quality will be available to the public.
-10-

That public purpose is not served, however, if the
privilege created in the peer-review statute is applied
beyond what was intended and what is necessary to
accomplish the public purpose.
Moretti v. Lowe. 592 A.2d 855 (Rl. 1991).
Plaintiffs are entitled to the same information as defendants regarding
incidents in hospitals. Defendants should not be allowed to hide basic factual
information behind the cloak of a peer-review statute. Proceedings of peer-review
committees can be adequately protected without denying parties access to
truthful, contemporaneously-created factual information contained in routine
incident reports.

III.
THE COMPETING INTERESTS IN THIS CASE
SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF
DISCLOSURE.
In Greenwood v.Wierdsma. 741 P.2d 1079 (Wyo. 1987), the Wyoming
Supreme Court found that Wyoming's care review statute was not intended to
abrogate claims against hospitals by making it impossible for a plaintiff to gather
the requisite evidence to prove them. Similarly, Utah's legislature did not intend to
make it impossible for a plaintiff to prove a case of negligence against a hospital
for failing to prevent an unattended patient fall. The care review statute was not
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designed to "exempt from discovery all relevant information, thereby precluding
the possibility of proving negligence." Id. at 1089. It may well be that the facts
necessary to prove the hospital's negligence in this case are found only in the
incident reports.
It is well-established that privileges should be narrowly construed because
they are in derogation of the common law and because they tend to thwart the
right of every man's evidence and defeat the very purpose of the adversary
system - to obtain the truth. United States v. Nixon. 417 U.S. 683, 710, 94 S Ct.
3090, 3108, 41 L.Ed 2d 1039 (1974).
In Hill v. Sandhu. 129 F.R.D. 548 (D. Kansas, 1990), the court concluded
that although incident reports may be considered by care review committees, the
fact that they contain contemporaneous statements of fact remove them from the
realm of privilege. The court noted, as our Supreme Court did in Benson, that
unfairness would result if any document became privileged simply because it was
submitted to a care review committee. The court noted the inequity of full one
side having access to the very documents it seeks to preclude the other side from
seeing. The court concluded that it would be inequitable to permit defendants to
use the privileged information in the preparation of their defense while precluding
plaintiffs access to the same information. Id. at 551. See also, Porter v. Snyder.
115 F.R.D. 77 (D. Kansas 1987) (Also holding incident reports are not subject to
-12-

the care review privilege).
Other courts have expressed grave concern over the constitutionality of
broadly construing care review statutes:
In the present case the legislature granted a peer review
privilege to health care providers to maintain staff
competency by encouraging frank and open discussions
and thus improving the quality of medical care in Kansas.

We must weigh that privilege against the Plaintiffs right to
due process and the judicial need for the fair
administration of justice. There can be no question that
in granting the privilege, the legislature did not intend to
restrict or eliminate plaintiff's right to bring a medical
malpractice action against a health care provider. To
allow the hospital here to insulate from discovery the
facts and information which go to the heart of the
plaintiffs' claim would deny the plaintiffs that right and, in
the words of the federal court, 'raise significant
constitutional implications.'
Adams v. St. Francis Regional Med. Ctr.. 955 P.2d 1169, 1187 (Kan. 1998) citing
to Hill v. Sandhu. 129 F.R.D. 548, 551 (D. Kan. 1990).
Finally, the United States Supreme Court addressed an extremely important
privilege in United States v. Nixon. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). The issue was whether
the presidential privilege "trumped" a subpoena from the special prosecutor for the
Nixon tapes. The courtfirstnoted that it is "emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is." Id. at 703 citing Marburv v.
Madison. 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). Next, the court considered the purpose of
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the presidential privilege. It acknowledged that:
Human experience teaches that those who expect public
dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor
with a concern for appearances and for their own
interests to the detriment of the decision-making process.
Id. at 705. The Supreme Court recognized that the rationale behind the privilege
included the need for privacy, candor and exemption from liability for public
dissemination. Significantly, those are the very factors which cause health care
providers to assert the care review privilege. Despite the national and
international importance of protecting presidential decision-making processes, the
court found clear constitutional limitations applicable to the privilege. Its findings
are germane, if not controlling, here. Specifically, the court found
The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary
system is both fundamental and comprehensive. . . .
[T]he very integrity of the judicial system and public
confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all
the facts, within the framework of the Rules of Evidence.
* * * *

[T]he allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that
is demonstrably relevant... would cut deeply into the
guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the
basic functions of the court.
Id. at 709, 712.
The public interest in protecting the decision-making processes of the
president of the United States is undoubtedly of greater significance that the
-14-

deliberations of a hospital's care review committee. The highest court in the land
has declared that no privilege trumps the constitutional right of due process and
procedural fairness. Where public confidence depends on full disclosure of all the
facts, a privilege, even the presidential privilege, must yield.

IV.

THE AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA WRIGHT PROVIDES
INADEQUATE BASIS FOR SUSTAINING THE CLAIM
OF PRIVILEGE.
The Hospital claims that the affidavit of its risk manager, Linda Wright,
establishes that the requirements of Utah's care review statute "are satisfied and
that any incident report addressing Mr. Cannon's fall is privileged." (Hospital's
memorandum, p.3) (R. 70). The Hospital cites Arlington Memorial Hospital
Foundation Inc. v. Barton. 952 SW.2d 927, 929-930 (Texas App. 1997) for the
proposition that an affidavit which tracks statutory language establishes that the
peer-review privilege applies and shifts the burden to the party seeking discovery
to controvert the affidavit. That case does not support the proposition. On the
contrary, it and several other Texas decisions specifically require that an affidavit
asserting the privilege must be accompanied by copies of the documents allegedly
subject to the privilege, for the court's in-camera review. Id; See also In re
Osteopathic Medical Center of Texas. 16 SW.3d 881 (Texas App.- Ft. Worth
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2000); Northeast Community Hospital v. Gregg. 815 SW.2d 320 (Texas App. - Ft.
Worth 1991); Memorial Hospital. The Woodlands v. McCown. 927 SW.2d 1 (Tex.
1996).
In the case cited by the hospital, the affidavit was accompanied not only by
the documents sought to be protected from discovery but also by the hospital's
bylaws, rules and regulations. (952 SW.2d at 930). Here, Ms. Wright's affidavit
was not accompanied by the incident reports claimed to be privileged nor by the
hospital's bylaws, rules, regulations or protocols. Without such documentation,
there is no corroboration of the risk manager's naked assertion that the incident
reports were created specifically and solely for care review purposes.
In the Texas cases, the affidavits of the parties claiming privilege specifically
asserted that the documents in question were confidential and that only the peerreview committees and their authorized representatives had access to them.
Linda Wright's affidavit comes short of making that assertion. Ms. Wright's
affidavit does not aver that no persons other than those charged with quality
assurance responsibilities see the incident reports. Significantly, she does not
assert that the reports were kept from the hospital's counsel. If the hospital's
counsel has been allowed to see the incident reports, then one side to this suit
has an extremely unfair advantage. The incident reports reveal to that side but
not the other what actually occurred and who knows exactly what about the
-16-

incident and about the patient's pre and post mishap treatment. Further, the
reports may indicate where further investigation and discovery should go, who
should testify and what their testimony will be. The incident reports give one side
a knowledge of the basic critical facts while keeping the other side in the dark.
All of the Texas cases and those from other jurisdictions dealing with the
issue indicate that (1) the burden to establish the privilege is on the party seeking
to shield information from discovery; (2) the party asserting the privilege is obliged
to prove, by competent evidence, that the privilege applies to the information
sought and (3) the documents in question ought in all cases to be produced for incamera review by the court.
We believe a trial court's proper course, followed here, is
to examine each document at issue to determine
whether it, specifically, has been made part of the peerreview process. As it does so, the court should keep in
mind that the simple act of stamping the word
"confidential" on a piece of paper does not, in itself,
invoke the protection of the Act. The trial judge must be
told, how, when and why the stamp was used
Chicago Trust Co. v. Cook County Hospital. 698 NE.2d 641, 649 (III. App. 1 Dist.
1998). At least one court has found it to be an abuse of discretion for a trial court
to fail to perform an in-camera review of the documents claimed to be subject to a
care review privilege. See Northeast Community Hosp. v. Gregg. 815 SW.2d 320,
(Texas App. - Ft. Worth 1991).
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V.
THE HOSPITAL'S SUGGESTION THAT THE FACTS
CONTAINED IN ITS INCIDENT REPORTS WERE
INTENDED SOLELY FOR PRIVILEGED CARE-REVIEW
USE IS REBUTTED BY THE HOSPITAL'S OWN TRAINING
VIDEO.
In Benson v. IHC Hospitals. Inc.. 866 P.2d 537 (Utah 1993), our Supreme Court
declared that "only material and information prepared specifically for submission to a
peer-review committee" are subject to privilege. It further declared:
An obvious concern is whether §26-25-3 privileges only
documents prepared specifically to be submitted for review
purposes or whether the privilege also includes documents
that might or could be used in the review process. The
statutes' rationale tends to favor only the former scenario.
Otherwise, an argument could be advanced that all medical
documents prepared by hospital personnel are created to
improve health care rendered by a hospital, and therefore,
the care review privilege would apply to all such documents.
866 P.2d at 540. The foregoing analysis is identical to the analysis of the courts from
other jurisdictions cited in plaintiffs' memorandum in chief. Clearly, Utah aligns itself with
those authorities in favor of disclosure.
In its Benson decision, our Supreme Court also dealt with another legitimate
concern; that documents which should be part of a patient's medical record are labeled
as privileged documents and removed from the medical record.
[T]he Bensons express the concern that certain documents
that should be in the medical record are missing. They allege
that the hospital is labeling documents privileged that actually
belong in the medical record, Therefore, it will also be
necessary on remand for the trial court to determine what
documents exist that should have been produced but were
-18-

not. If indeed there are documents that should be in the
medical record that are not found there, then the statutory
privileges are being abused, and that information and those
documents are discoverable. Because petitioners [IHC
Hospitals, Inc. and Dr. Madsen] are asserting privileges, it is
their burden to show that nothing in missing from the medical
record.
866 P.2d at 540.
It has been established through formal discovery that nurses working at the
hospital are shown a training videotape entitled "Patient Falls: Panic or Prevention?".
That videotape has been produced in discovery. It specifically states, with respect to
patient falls:
All circumstances and findings should be documented in
the patient's chart and on the incident report form.
Clearly, the hospital's own standards require that "all circumstances and findings . . . be
documented in the patient's chart". It is precisely because the facts and circumstances
surrounding Mr. Cannon's fall are not documented in the patient's chart that Mrs.
Cannon seeks production of the incident reports. The patient's chart in this case
contains extremely sparse, incomplete information concerning the circumstances
surrounding his fall. It does not reveal whether Mr. Cannon attempted to activate his call
button or whether he otherwise called for help before the fall occurred. It does not
reveal when Mr. Cannon fell nor when his fall was discovered by his care providers. It is
unclear whether Mr. Cannon was heard to yell for help before or after his body was
heard hitting the floor.
Benson is still good law as to the hospital's having the burden of establishing that
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the requested documents do not belong in the medical record. Clearly, the facts and
circumstances surrounding the patient's fall belong in the patient's chart. The hospital's
own training videotape so states.
The Hospital should not be allowed to benefit from a practice of labeling as
privileged information which its own training film unequivocally states should be a part of
the patient's medical records.

VI.
PRODUCTION OF THE INCIDENT REPORTS SHOULD BE
COMPELLED HERE BECAUSE THE SAME HOSPITAL
WAS ORDERED TO PRODUCE AND DID PRODUCE
INCIDENT REPORTS IN A SIMILAR CASE INVOLVING A
PATIENT WHO FELL JUST ONE DAY BEFORE MR.
CANNON'S FALL
The plaintiffs in this case are the surviving heirs of a man who sustained fatal
injuries from an unattended fall while a patient at Salt Lake Regional Hospital on May
18, 2001. Just one day before Mr. Cannon's mishap, another patient at this hospital
sustained injuries from an unattended fall. That patient's injuries also proved fatal. In
the suit brought by his family (see Exhibit "E", attached), the hospital was and is
represented by the same law firm which represents it here
The other case is pending before Judge William Bohling as Case No. 020910871.
The plaintiffs in that case (the "Adam case") sought to compel production of incident
reports concerning the patient's fall. After the motion to compel was fully briefed, Judge
Bohling issued his decision granting the motion to compel (see Exhibit "F", attached). In
-20-

response to that order, the hospital did in fact produce its incident reports pertaining to
the fall of patient Melville Adam. (See Exhibit "G", attached).
The hospital argues that memorandum decisions concerning hospital incident
reports from other jurisdictions are "inapposite". This cannot be said about the decision
in the Adam case. A comparison of the two cases reveals the facts to be virtually
identical: same hospital; same time period; same problem (unattended patient fall);
same result (death from subdural hematoma/massive brain injury); same applicable law.
The fact that the hospital has already produced incident reports in the companion
case renders highly suspect its current risk manager's bald assertion that the incident
reports in this case were created and used solely for the purposes set forth in Utah's
care review statute. Denying the plaintiffs' motion to compel in this case will render the
hospital free to pick and choose when it wishes to hide behind the privilege. It will
produce incident reports it deems favorable in one case and keep them suppressed in
another case when the facts they reveal harm its case or rebut its defenses. The
unfairness produced by inconsistent application of the privilege is palpable.
For consistency and fairness, this Court should grant the motion to compel, as
Judge Bohling did in the companion case.
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VII.
THE DISTRICT COURTS INITIAL RULING ON THE
INCIDENT REPORTS PROVIDE NO BASIS FOR THE
HOSPITAL'S REFUSAL TO COOPERATE IN CONTINUING
DISCOVERY CONCERNING THE DISSEMINATION AND
USE OF THE INCIDENT REPORTS.
The district court's minute entry indicates it relied entirely on the affidavit of Linda
Wright as the factual basis for its finding that the incident reports are privileged. After
referring to statements in that affidavit, the district court stated:
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, this Court
finds that the reports are privileged.
(R. 174). There is absolutely no statement or implication in the minute entry
suggesting Mrs. Cannon may not try to gather contrary evidence.
The district court had ample opportunity in its minute entry to foreclose any
discovery into the accuracy of Linda Wright's affidavit assertions. It chose not to close
the door on such discovery. On the contrary, the minute entry seems to invite discovery.
Mrs. Cannon should at the least be allowed to interrogate Linda Wright as to the
Hospital's apparent violation of its own standard concerning documentation of
circumstances surrounding patient falls. Mrs. Cannon should also be allowed to
discover the identity of all persons who have seen the incident reports and the purpose
of their seeing the reports.
Linda Wright's affidavit was crafted in a way to conceal whether the Hospital's
own counsel has had access to the incident reports. If the Hospital's counsel has had
access to those reports, denying access to Mrs. Cannon's counsel would be grossly
-22-

unfair. At the very least, the incident reports should have been produced for the Court's
in-camera review. So too should the Hospital's bylaws, and all rules and protocols
pertaining to patient rights, patient records and the use of information contained in
incident reports.

CONCLUSION
The incident reports contain basic factual information about a mishap which
caused a patient's death. It is not fair for only one party to have that basic information.
The hospital's own training video states that everything known about a patient's fall and
the circumstances surrounding it should be documented in the patient's chart. Keeping
information contained in the incident reports out of a patient's chart violates the
hospital's own policy.
The hospital's affidavit falls short of meeting the burden imposed on a party
claiming privilege. It is conclusory in nature. It was crafted in a way to conceal whether
the hospital's own counsel has had access to the incident reports. If they have had
access, denying access to Mrs. Cannon's counsel would be grossly unfair. At the very
least, the incident reports should have been produced for the court's in camera review.
So too should the hospital's bylaws, and all rules and protocols pertaining to patient
rights, patient records and the use of information contained in incident reports. The
hospital has failed to meet its burden.
The hospital should not be allowed to benefit from a practice of labeling as
confidential information which should clearly be a part of the patient's medical records.
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Finally, constitutional considerations require that limits be placed upon privileges in order
to protect the due process rights of litigants. Assertion of privilege in this case should not
be allowed to thwart the very purpose of the adversary system of justice - the
ascertainment of truth.

The competing interests here should be resolved in favor of

disclosure.

RELIEF REQUEST
Mrs. Cannon asks this Court to compel production of the Hospital's incident
reports concerning Gary Cannon's fall. In the alternative, Mrs. Cannon asks this
Court to compel the Hospital to cooperate fully in continuing efforts to discover the
actual dissemination and use of such incident reports. Mrs. Cannon also seeks an
award of fees incurred by her in attempting to discover who has seen the incident
reports and for what purposes.
DATED this _J_/

day of October, 2004.

W&td^46^===>
Douglas G. Mortenssjn
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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ADDENDUM EXHIBITS
March 18, 2004 Notice of Deposition of Linda Wright
Rule 30(b)(6) Notice of Deposition of Salt Lake Regional Medical Center
Representative(s)
Defendant Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc.'s Answers to Plaintiffs'
First set of Requests for Admissions
Defendant Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc.'s Answers to Plaintiffs'
Second Set of Interrogatories
Complaint and Jury Demand (lona Adam, et al. v. Salt Lake Regional
Medical Center, Inc.)
Minute Entry Decision and Order (lona Adam, et al. v. Salt Lake Regional
Medical Center, Inc.)
Defendant Salt Lake Regional Medical Center's Certification of Compliance
With the Court's Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel and
Response to Plaintiffs' Request for Production of Documents (lona Adam, et
al. v. Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc.)
Motion to Compel Discovery and for Sanctions and Supporting
Memorandum
Defendant Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc.'s Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery and for Sanctions
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum Supporting Their Motion to Compel
Discovery and for Sanctions
Affidavit as to Costs and Attorneys Fees
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Finally, constitutional considerations require that limits be placed upon privileges in order
to protect the due process rights of litigants. Assertion of privilege in this case should not
be allowed to thwart the very purpose of the adversary system of justice - the
ascertainment of truth.

The competing interests here should be resolved in favor of

disclosure.

RELIEF REQUEST
Mrs. Cannon asks this Court to compel production of the Hospital's incident
reports concerning Gary Cannon's fall. In the alternative, Mrs. Cannon asks this
Court to compel the Hospital to cooperate fully in continuing efforts to discover the
actual dissemination and use of such incident reports. Mrs. Cannon also seeks an
award of fees incurred by her in attempting to discover who has seen the incident
reports and for what purposes.
DATED this

'

day of October, 2004.

\Wyk& >
Dougtas G. Mortensisn
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appeliants

Exhibit A

Douglas G. Mortensen, USB #2329
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

(801)363-2244
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KATHERYN CANNON, as surviving
spouse of GARY R. CANNON,
deceased, LANE CANNON and
!
ROLAND CANNON, as surviving children
and legal heirs of GARY R. CANNON,
deceased,
Plaintiffs,

NOTICE OF
DEPOSITION OF
LINDA WRIGHT
Civil No.: 020914614
Judge Judith S. Atherton

vs.
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER, INC., JOHN AND JANE DOES
1 THROUGH X and DOE BUSINESS
ENTITIES 1 THROUGH V,
Defendants.

I
TO THE ABOVE NAMED PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT PLAINTIFFS WILL TAKE THE
DEPOSITION OF SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER'S RISK MANAGER,
LINDA WRIGHT, before a Certified Court Reporter and Notary Public, on March 31,

2004 at the law offices of Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson beginning at
2:00 p.m. and continuing thereafter until completed.
The deposition will be on oral interrogatories and is taken pursuant to Rule 26
and 30 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
NOTICE IS FURTHER GIVEN that the deposition of Linda Wright may be
videotaped to preserve for use at trial.
DATED this / ?

day of March , 2004.

Douglas G. Mortensen
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the /% day of March, 2004,1 caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to be delivered to the following via the means indicated:
Elizabeth L. Willey
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11 th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

/
•
•
•

^/Uyv^

Pldg Notice of Deposition - Linda Wright.0318
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U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand-Delivered
Federal Express

f*J&MAy.fx-fr-l/"—»

Exhibit B

Douglas G. Mortensen, USB #2329
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801)363-2244
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KATHERYN CANNON, as surviving
spouse of GARY R. CANNON,
deceased, LANE CANNON and
ROLAND CANNON, as surviving children
and legal heirs of GARY R. CANNON,
deceased,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

RULE 30 (b)(6) NOTICE OF
DEPOSITION OF SALT LAKE
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
REPRESENTATIVE(S)

Civil No.: 020914614
Judge Judith S. Atherton

SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER, INC., JOHN AND JANE DOES
1 THROUGH X and DOE BUSINESS
j
ENTITIES 1 THROUGH V,
Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6), URCP, plaintiffs hereby gives notice of their intent to
depose:
1.

Each person who has knowledge or information as to the identity of each
person who has seen or may have seen the incident report(s) which Salt

Lake Regional Medical Center has refused to produce in this action;
2.

Each and every person who has at any time seen the incident reports Salt
Lake Regional Medical Center has refused to produce in this action
pertaining to the fall on or about May 18, 2001 of patient Gary R. Cannon,

before a Certified Court Reporter and Notary Public, on March 3.1,2004 at the law
offices of Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson beginning at 2:30 p.m. and
continuing thereafter until completed.
NOTICE IS FURTHER GIVEN that these depositions may be videotaped to
preserve for use at trial.
DATED this / ^

day of March , 2004.

Dougfas G. Mortensen
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the /tf day of March, 2004,1 caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to be delivered to the following via the means indicated:
/
•
•
•

Elizabeth L. Willey
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

(j^s\s^As~>

PIdg Notice of Deposition - SL Reg Med Ctr Reps.0318
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U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand-Delivered
Federal Express

yLlz/iusWJlAr-—>

Exhibit C

DAVID W. SLAGLE (2975)
ELIZABETH L. WILLEY (5639)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTESEAU
Attorneys for Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc.
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KATHRYN CANNON, as surviving spouse
of GARY R. CANNON, deceased, LANE
CANNON and ROLAND CANNON, as
surviving children and legal heirs of GARY
R. CANNON, deceased,

DEFENDANT SALT LAKE
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
INC'S ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFFS'
FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR
ADMISSIONS

Plaintiffs.
vs.
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER, INC., JOHN AND JANE DOES
1 THROUGH X AND DOE BUSINESS
ENTITIES 1 THROUGH V.

Case No. 020914614
Judge Judith S.H. Atherton

Defendants.

Defendant Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, tic. responds to Plaintiffs' First Set of

Requests for Admissions as follows:
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS
REQUEST NO. 1; Admit that the incident report(s) which you have refused to produce
have been seen by your legal counsel in this action.
RESPONSE: Objection. This request seeks information that is privileged and protected
by the attorney client and work product privileges. Additionally, defendant refers to statutes and
case law cited in Defendant Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc.'s Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery and Defendant Salt Lake Regional Medical
Center, Inc.'s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery and for
Sanctions, as the basis for the claimed privilege. Furthermore, Judge Judith Atherton has ruled
that the subject document is privileged, and plaintiffs' Motion to Compel its production was
denied.
REQUEST NO. 2: Admit that the incident report(s) which you have refused to produce
have been seen by David Slagle, Elizabeth Willey or one or more paralegals, legal assistants, law
clerks, nurse consultants or other agent, employee or independent contractor employed by Snow,
Christensen & Martineau.
RESPONSE: Objection. The request seeks information that is privileged and protected
by the attorney client and work product privileges. Additionally, defendant refers to statutes and
case law cited in Defendant Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc.'s Memorandum in

2

Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery and Defendant Salt Lake Regional Medical
Center, Inc/s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery and for
Sanctions, as the basis for the claimed privilege. Furthermore, Judge Judith Atherton has ruled
that the document is privileged, and plaintiffs' Motion to Compel its production was denied.
DATED this J j . day of April, 2004.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

ifL L ULlU.
David W. Slagle
Elizabeth L.Willey
Attorneys for Salt Lake Regional Medical
Center, Inc.
\\scm-prQlaw\documents\020440-0051\SN\46391.wpd
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I am employed by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for
Defendant, Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, that I served the attached DEFENDANT SALT LAKE
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC'S ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFFS, FIRST SET OF
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS (Case Number 020914614, Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah) upon the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope
addressed to:
Douglas G. Mortensen
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the _ J ^ r d a y of April, 2004.

Exhibit D

DAVID W. SLAGLE (2975)
ELIZABETH L. WILLEY (5639)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc.
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KATHRYN CANNON, as surviving spouse
of GARY R. CANNON, deceased, LANE
CANNON and ROLAND CANNON, as
surviving children and legal heirs of GARY
R. CANNON, deceased,

DEFENDANT SALT LAKE
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
INC.'S ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFFS'
SECOND SET OF
INTERROGATORIES

Plaintiffs,
vs.

SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER, INC., JOHN AND JANE DOES
1 THROUGH X AND DOE BUSINESS
ENTITIES 1 THROUGH V,

Case No. 020914614
Judge Judith S.H. Atherton

Defendants.

Defendant Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc. responds to Plaintiffs' Second Set of
Interrogatories as follows:
INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Separately, with respect to each matter propounded in the

requests for admission served concurrently herewith for which your response is other than
unqualified admission:
A.

Describe in detail the factual basis for the failure or refusal to unqualifiedly admit
the matter;

B.

Identify by name and address each person who has knowledge supporting any
ground for the refusal or failures to unqualifiedly admit the matter;

C.

List and describe each document which supports or provides a basis for any
ground for your refusal or failure to unqualifiedly admit the matter and, separately,
with respect to each document, quote verbatim specific language of the same
which you contend supports or provides the basis for such refusal or failure to
unqualifiedly admit the matter or produce the document in its entirety.

RESPONSE:
A. Defendant objected to the Request for Admission No. 1 and No. 2 in Plaintiffs First
Set of Requests for Admissions, on the basis of attorney client and work product privileges, the
statutes and case law cited in Defendant Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc.'s Memorandum
in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery and Defendant Salt Lake Regional
Medical Center, Inc.'s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery
and for Sanctions, and the minute entry signed by Judge Judith Atherton wherein she denied
plaintiffs Motion to Compel the production of the subject incident report.
B. Counsel for both parties in this action; Judge Judith Atherton.
C. Please refer to cases and statutes cited in Defendant Salt Lake Regional Medical
2

Center, Inc., Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery and
Defendant Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc.'s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiflfs'
Motion to Compel Discovery and for Sanctions, and Judge Judith Atherton's signed and dated
Minute Entry. Plaintiffs' counsel can easily read and refer to the cases and statutes cited within
defendant's memorandum and the Minute Entry of Judge Judith Atherton.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Set forth the name, job title or job description of every
person who has seen the incident report(s) you have refused to produce in this action.
RESPONSE: Defendant objects to this interrogatory on the basis that it seeks
information that is privileged and protected by the attorney client and work product privileges.
Furthermore, defendant objects to the language "refused to produce" as disingenuous, since both
counsel are aware that Judge Judith Atherton denied plaintiflfs' Motion to Compel production of
said report, ruling that it was privileged. Without waiving and subject to said objections,
defendant responds as follows: Refer to Affidavit of Linda Wright, filed in conjunction with
defendant's Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc.'s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiflfs'
Motion to Compel.
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DATED this / £

day of April, 2004

SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
INC

LuuJarWnght
Risk Manager
STATE OF UTAH
55

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

Before me, the undersigned Notary Public in and for said County and State, this.
day of April, 2004, personally appeared Linda Wright, as Risk Manager of Salt Lake Regional
Medical Center, Inc, and acknowledged the execution of the above and foregoing DEFENDANT
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC'S ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFFS'
SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES
NOTARY PUBLIC
DONNA WALTON
1050 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84102
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES
AUGUST 23, 2006
STATE OF UTAH

Vs,

yrJ>

Osrs/WO,

NOTARY PLfBLIC
Residing at:
'^CQcV

AS TO OBJECTIONS ONLY:
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MART1NEAU

Single
EluabethL Wifiey
AttorneysforDefendant
Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc
\^ra^ofaw\Doc«nai»\fl21H4*W*Slvi.v .46353 *pa
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VA^O&fcrfX.
.
WiV<
^

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I am employed by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for
Defendant, Salt Lake Regional Medical Center; that I served the attached DEFENDANT SALT LAKE
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC'S ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND SET OF
INTERROGATORIES (Case Number 020914614, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of
Utah) upon the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed
to:
Douglas G. Mortensen
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the f(n day of April, 2004.

Exhibit E

FILES DISTRICT'COWIT
Third Judicial District

OCT 1 0 2092
SALT LAKE COUNTY

Douglas G. Mortensen, USB #2329
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

By

,

Deputy Clerk

(801)363-2244
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IONA ADAM, as personal representative
and surviving spouse of MELVILLE
I
GILBERT ADAM, deceased,
FREDERICK JOHN ADAM, DONALD
PAUL ADAM, GARY LYNN ADAM,
STEPHEN LEE ADAM, JAMES L.
ADAM, MARY CAROLYN LIVERMORE
McMAHAN, PATRICIA ELLEN
LIVERMORE HATCH and DAWNELLE
ADAM PACE, as surviving children of
MELVILLE GILBERT ADAM, deceased,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER, INC., JOHN AND JANE DOES
1 THROUGH X and DOE BUSINESS
ENTITIES 1 THROUGH V,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs complain of defendants and allege:

COMPLAINT AND
JURY DEMAND

Civil No.:

C£>&ci[0'7y3'\

Judge ~ T y ) h i f H ^ \
j \
/
^

PARTIES AND JURISDICTION
1.

This is an action brought under Utah's Wrongful Death Act, UCA §78-11-7

and Utah's Survival of Actions Act, UCA §78-11-12, for damages arising out of the
death of Melville Gilbert Adam on May 19, 2001. This action is also brought under
Utah's Health Care Malpractice Act, UCA §78-14-1, et seq.
2.

The death of Melville Gilbert Adam occurred at Salt Lake Regional

Hospital in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah on May 19, 2001.
3.

Plaintiff is the surviving spouse of Melville Gilbert Adam. She is also the

decedent's personal representative. Plaintiff lona Adam is and at all times material
hereto has been a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah.
4.

Plaintiffs Frederick John Adam, Donald Paul Adam, Gary Lynn Adam,

Stephen Lee Adam, James L. Adam and Dawnelle Adam Pace are adult natural or
adopted children of the decedent Melville Gilbert Adam. Plaintiffs Mary Carolyn
Livermore McMahan and Patricia Ellen Livermore Hatch are step-children of the
decedent who are included as intended beneficiaries of his estate pursuant to the
Melville G. Adam Family Inter Vivos Trust signed by the decedent on February 23,
1976.
5.

John and Jane Does I through X are persons who may bear or share

liability to plaintiffs for the decedent's injury and/or death. When their identities become
known, plaintiff may seek leave to join them as named parties in this action.
-2-

6.

Doe Business Entities I through V are entities ultimately responsible for

decision making at defendant Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc. and are
ultimately responsible for the safety of patients treated there. Such entities make
and/or approve the policies, procedures, protocols and guidelines adopted and/or
followed at Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc. Plaintiffs believe and therefore
allege that Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc. is owned by a large corporation
which owns several hospitals throughout the United States and has its principal place of
business in the State of Tennessee. Plaintiffs also believe and allege that the
ownership of Salt Lake Regional Medical Center has changed hands in recent years.
Plaintiffs are uncertain as to the identity of the Doe Business Entity defendants.
Plaintiffs assert that such defendants may bear or share responsibility to them for the
decedent's injury and/or death. When the true identities of Doe Business Entity
defendants I through V become known, plaintiffs will seek leave to join them as named
parties in this action.
7.

On or about May 9, 2002, plaintiffs caused a Notice of Intent to

Commence Legal Action to be served upon defendant Salt Lake Regional Medical
Center, Inc. by Certified Mail, return receipt requested, pursuant to UCA §78-14-8.
More than 90 days have elapsed since service of the aforesaid Notice. In addition, on
or about May 17, 2002, plaintiffs caused a request to be made with the Utah State
Department of Business Regulations, Division of Occupational and Professional
-3-

Licensing for a Prelitigation Medical Panel Review Hearing pursuant to UCA §78-14-12.
The requested hearing has been held as required by statute and a Certificate of
Compliance issued on September 25, 2002 by DOPL's Regulatory and Compliance
Officer, W. Ray Walker. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to bring this action.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
8.

On or about May 8, 2001, 74 year old Melville Gilbert Adam was admitted

to Salt Lake Regional Medical Center for treatment of heart valve insufficiency.
9.

Immediately prior to this admission, Mr. Adam had been a patient at the

Evergreen Canyons Rehabilitation Center where he had undergone rehabilitative care
following treatment for an infection. While at Evergreen Canyons, Mr. Adam suffered
one or more falls.
10.

Upon his admission to Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, a large sign

was placed on the door of Mr. Adam's room indicating that he was a fall risk. This sign
remained on the door of his hospital room from the time of his admission to the time of
his demise.
11.

On May 11, 2001, Mr. Adam underwent aortic valve replacement and

mitral valve repair surgery at the hands of Dr. David A. Bull, M.D. Postoperatively, Mr.
Adam made "an excellent recovery", according to Dr. Bull. Mr. Adam was extubated on
the evening following surgery. On post-operative day number 2, his monitoring lines
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were removed. On post-operative day number 3, his arterial line was removed. On
post-operative day number 4, his pacing wires were removed. Dr. Bull believed Mr.
Adam would be a good candidate for discharge on May 17 or May 18, 2001. The plan
was for Mr. Adam to be returned to Evergreen Canyons for continued convalescence
and rehabilitation.
12.

Sometime during the early morning hours of May 17, 2001, Mr. Adam fell

to the floor of his ICU hospital room and sustained a subdural hematoma to his head.
Following Mr. Adam's fall, he remained on the floor of his ICU hospital room for an
unknown length of time. Later, a nursing attendant found him on the floor and assisted
him in getting back into his bed.
13.

Approximately one hour after Mr. Adam was returned to his bed, his blood

pressure was checked and found to be considerably elevated at 154/112. His blood
pressure was rechecked approximately 10 minutes later and found to be even more
elevated, at 174/117. The nursing chart indicates Dr. Bull was notified and medication
was given to the patient "as ordered". There is no indication Dr. Bull was informed that
the patient had sustained a fall. The only indication is that Dr. Bull was notified of the
patient's elevated blood pressure.
14.

At approximately 0430 hours, Mr. Adam's blood pressure was again

taken. It was 145/115. Approximately 30 minutes later, a nursing attendant discovered
Mr. Adam was unable to move his right leg. At that time, a hematoma was noted on the
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left side of the back of his head. Hospital records indicate that Dr. Bull was notified and
that a CT scan and x-rays were ordered. The Hospital records indicate that at 0540
hours, intubation was ordered. According to the hospital's records, the patient was not
intubated until 0615 hours. At 0645 hours, Mr. Adam was taken to radiology for a CT
scan. The patient's family was not notified of his acutely grave condition until
approximately 7:35 a.m.
15.

The CT scan revealed an acute subdural hematoma with a "subtentorial

bleed".
16.

At the time of his hospitalization and for several years prior thereto, Mr.

Adam was completely bald. It was his habit and custom to keep his head shaved and
free of any hair whatsoever. Whatever bruising or discoloration may have resulted from
his fall during the early morning hours of May 17, 2001, would not have been covered
up or disguised by hair, but would have been visible to any reasonably observant care
provider.
17.

Due to the extensive amount of acute interhemispheric tentorial and right

frontal acute subdural hematoma and rapid clinical decline, a decision was made to
perform an emergency craniectomy in an effort to remove or reduce pressure on the
patient's brain. The patient was taken to the operating room at approximately 9:45. The
surgery was begun at approximately 10:35 a.m. It lasted approximately 3 hours.
Following the surgery, Mr. Adam had no neurologic improvement. His pupils remained
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fixed and dilated. He had no gag reflex. He had no motor responses to pain.
Neurologically, he had only minimal brain stem reflexes.
18.

After full discussion with family members, the attending physicians

recommended withdrawal of ventilator support. Mechanical support was withdrawn and
the patient expired at approximately 7:25 p.m. on May 19, 2001.
19.

As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of the defendants,

decedent Melville Gilbert Adam suffered severe and excruciating pain, trauma,
immobility, discomfort, fear, emotional distress, loss of function and loss of enjoyment
of life prior to his demise.

In addition, Mr. Adam's untimely death prevented him

and/or his heirs from receiving substantial sums of money in retirement benefits, to their
special damage.
20.

As a further direct and proximate result of the negligence of the

defendants, significant medical expenses were incurred for the care of the decedent
from the time of his fall to the time of his death and significant funeral and burial
expenses were incurred thereafter, to the special damage of the plaintiffs and/or the
plaintiffs' collateral source providers.
21.

As a further direct and proximate result of the negligence of the

defendants, the decedent's surviving spouse, children and step-children have sustained
a loss of spousal and parental guidance, affection, society and consortium to their
general damage and a loss of financial assistance, income, inheritance, etc. to their
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special damage.

COUNT I
(NEGLIGENCE)
22.

Plaintiffs adopt and reallege the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1

through 21 hereof as fully and completely as if set forth in full in this count.
23.

The defendants, by and through their employees and agents, provided

substandard, negligent medical care to Melville Gilbert Adam. But for such
substandard, negligent medical care, Mr. Adam would not have fallen and sustained
injury to his head nor have died from such head injury.
24.

The particulars of the defendants' negligence are under investigation but

at this time are believed to include:
a.

Failure to provide a level of care and monitoring expected in an
intensive care unit;

b.

Failure to maintain adequate staffing at all critical times during Mr.
Adam's care in the intensive care unit;

c.

Failure to take appropriate, reasonable steps to provide a safe
environment for Mr. Adam and to prevent him from suffering a fall
to the floor while an ICU patient;

d.

Failure to respond in a timely fashion to Mr. Adam's call for
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assistance;
Failure to timely discover and appropriate act upon Mr. Adam's fall;
Failure to discover and diagnose in a timely, appropriate fashion
the significant injuries sustained by Mr. Adam as a result of his fall;
Failure to provide prompt, appropriate and necessary treatment to
Mr. Adam for the injury sustained by him in his fall;
Failure to provide timely, emergent care for Mr. Adam after his
significant symptoms were finally discovered;
Failure to prevent the simultaneous administration of both
Coumadin and Aspirin, ordered by two different treating physicians
without apparent knowledge of the other physician's order;
Failure to timely notify the patient's family of his grave, lifethreatening condition;
Failure to take or recommend appropriate pre-mortem and postmortem action, including an autopsy and/or blood tests to ascertain
the level of blood thinning agents in the patient's blood.
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COUNT II
(RES IPSA LOQUITUR)
25.

Plaintiffs adopt and reallege the allegations set froth in paragraphs 1

through 24 hereof as fully and completely as if set forth in full in this count.
26.

At the time of the injury complained of herein, the persons and

instrumentalities who/which caused the injuries sustained by the decedent were under
the exclusive management and control of the defendants.
27.

The injury Melville Gilbert Adam sustained while under the care and

treatment of defendants was of a kind which ordinarily would have not occurred in the
absence of negligence on the part of the defendants and/or their agents and
employees.
28.

There is no apparent responsible cause for the injury of which plaintiffs

complain other than the negligence of defendants and/or their agents and employees.
29.

The failure of defendants to prevent the injury speaks for itself as an act of

negligence for which defendants are liable as a matter of law.

COUNT III
(PUNITIVE DAMAGES)
30.

Plaintiffs adopt and reallege the allegations set froth in paragraphs 1

through 29 hereof as fully and completely as if set forth in full in this count.
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31.

Plaintiffs believe and therefore allege that the injury and death of Melville

Gilbert Adam may have been caused by conduct manifesting a knowing and reckless
indifference toward and disregard for the safety of Mr. Adam. In addition, plaintiffs
believe they are entitled to conduct discovery as to whether the defendants engaged in
any willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct with respect to the injury
and death of Melville Gilbert Adam.
32.

If direct or circumstantial evidence revealed through investigation, formal

discovery and/or at trial supports a finding that defendants acted with a knowing and
reckless indifference toward and a disregard of Mr. Adam's safety or that their acts or
omissions are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, an
assessment of exemplary or punitive damages against defendants will be appropriate
and is hereby requested.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs demand judgment against defendants as follows:
A.

For general damages in a reasonable sum;

B.

For special damages for medical and other expenses and for loss of
earnings and earning capacity, in amounts as shall be proved at trial;

C.

For interest on all items of special damage as allowed by law;

D.

For exemplary damages in an appropriate sum;

E.

For plaintiffs' costs of suit and such and other relief as the Court may
deem proper.
-11-

JURY DEMAND
Plaintiffs hereby demand trial by jury and herewith tender the required jury
demand fee.
DATED this *& day of

2002.

Douglas G. Mortenser
MATHESON, MORTENBEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Pldg Complaint.0930
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Exhibit F

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District
OCT 2 8 2003
By.

SALT LAKE Q W ^ T Y .
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IONA ADAM, et al•

MINUTE ENTRY DECISION AND
ORDER

Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 020910871
vs.
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER, et al.
Defendant.

Before the Court

is Plaintiff's Second Motion

pursuant to Rule 4-501.

to Compel,

Having considered the Motion and the

Memoranda submitted by the parties, the Court enters the following
decision:
The present Motion seeks to compel Defendants' production of
incident reports requested from the Plaintiffs.

In denying the

request, the Defendant asserted that "if such documents exist, they
are not discoverable and are privileged pursuant to § 26-25-3, Utah
Code Ann. (1996)."

This statutory provision, otherwise known as

the care review privilege,

"privileges only documents prepared

specifically to be submitted for review purposes" and cannot be
read so broadly as extending to all "documents that might or could
be used in the review process."

Benson ex rel. Benson v. IHC

ADAM V. SLRMC

PAGE 2

MINUTE ENTRY DECISION

Hospitals, 866 P.2d 537, 540 (Utah 1993).

Utah law is clear that

the party invoking the privilege must produce evidence establishing
its applicability to the documents in question. See id., at 538.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel is hereby GRANTED.
Defendant is hereby ordered to produce either the incident reports
as requested, or evidence that the incident reports were created
"specifically

to

be

submitted

for

review

purposes."

This

constitutes the final order of the Court on the matters referenced
herein.

No further order is required;

Ofl

DATED this C O

day of October, 2003.

-liLc IA

Judge WILLIAM B. ,;£OHL_ING_
District Court Judge
Vv
- *

/

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 020910871 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated this

a\o day of

NAME
DOUGLAS G MORTENSEN
ATTORNEY PLA
648 E 100 S
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84102
DAVID W. SLAGLE
ATTORNEY DEF
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, 11TH
FLOOR
SLC UT 84145

'fa*~

20 0"3

^L

<~v

Deputy Court Clerk

Page 1 (last)

Exhibit G

DAVID W. SLAGLE - A2975
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
Salt Lake Regional Medical Center
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
IN THE TfflRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
IONA ADAM, as personal representative and
surviving spouse of MELVILLE GILBERT
ADAM, deceased, FREDERICK JOHN
ADAM, DONALD PAUL ADAM, GARY
LYNN ADAM, STEPHEN LEE ADAM,
JAMES L. ADAM, MARY CAROLYN
LIVERMORE McMAHAN, PATRICIA
ELLEN LIVERMORE HATCH and
DAWNELLE ADAM PACE, as surviving
children of MELVILLE GILBERT ADAM,
deceased,

DEFENDANT SALT LAKE REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER'S CERTIFICATION
OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE
COURT'S ORDER REGARDING
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL
AND RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS'
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No. 020910871
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER, INC., JOHN AND JANE DOES 1
through X and DOE BUSINESS ENTITIES 1
through V,

Judge William B. Bohling

Defendants.

Defendant, Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, hereby produces the following documents in
response to plaintiffs' Request for Production of Documents and in compliance with the Court's
Memorandum decision dated October 22,2003 and October 28,2003:

1.

Defendant has attached a copy of an Unusual Occurrence Report dated May 17,

2001, completed by Nathan Askerlund, LPN.
2.

Defendant has attached a copy of an Unusual Occurrence Report dated May 21,

2001, completed by Melissa Hadley.
3.

Defendant has attached a copy of a document entitled Patient Concern Response

dated May 17,2001.
4.

Defendant has attached copies of the nursing records for three other patients that

were being cared for by Nathan Askerlund on the night that Mr. Adam sustained his fall. The names
and identification data for each of these patients has been redacted.
Defendant believes and hereby certifies that, to the best of its information, knowledge and
belief, it has now complied with plaintiffs' Request for Production of Documents and both Court
Orders regarding the various motions to compel filed by plaintiffs.
DATED this %)

day of October, 2003.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

tfavidW.Slagfe
Q
Attorneys for Defendant Salt Lake Regional
Medical Center, Inc.

O:\20440\50\Pleading\Cert of Compliance.wpd
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I am employed by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for
defendant, Salt Lake Regional Medical Center; that I served the attached DEFENDANT SALT LAKE
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER'S CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE
COURT'S ORDERREGARDING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL AND RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
(Case Number 020910871, Before the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah)
upon the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Douglas G. Mortensen
Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Robert Wallace
Plant, Wallace, Christensen & Kanell
136 East South Temple #1700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for ICCN and Ann LaPolla, R.N.
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the ^%f day of October, 2003.

^%^^2PJ^.

Exhibit H

Douglas G. Mortensen, USB #2329
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801)363-2244
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KATHERYN CANNON, as survivingspouseofGARYR. CANNON,
deceased, LANE CANNON and
ROLAND CANNON,- as surviving children
and legal heirs of GARY R. CANNON,
deceased,

MOTION TO COMPEL
DISCOVERY AND FOR
SANCTIONS
AND
SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM
Civil No.: 020914614

Plaintiffs,
Judge Judith S. Atherton
vs.
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER, INC., JOHN AND JANE DOES
1 THROUGH X and DOE BUSINESS
ENTITIES 1 THROUGH V,
Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 37, URCP, plaintiffs move this court for an order compelling
discovery and for an award of costs and reasonable attorneys fees incurred by them in
connection with this motion. The discovery sought to be compelled are the depositions

of the Hospital's risk manager and other persons who have seen or who have
information as to the identity of persons who have seen the incident reports the Hospital
has refused to produce in this case.
This motion is supported by the following memorandum.

MEMORANDUM
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
1.

Sometime in March of this year, an unsigned, undated minute entry was

mailed to counsel in this case. The minute entry reflects a denial of plaintiffs motion to
compel the hospital to produce its incident reports concerning the fall and death of
patient Gary Cannon.
2.

The aforesaid minute entry states in pertinent part:
The only evidence presented in this case is the Affidavit of
Linda Wright. Ms. Wright asserts that the "Incident reports
are created specifically for submission to the [care review
department]," and that "Incident reports are not created or
used for any purpose other than for evaluating or improving
the health care rendered to patients at Salt Lake Regional
Medical C e n t e r . . . Incident reports are not included as part
of the patient's medical records."
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, this court
finds that the reports are privileged.

3.

The minute entry does not preclude discovery into the accuracy of Linda

Wright's affidavit assertions.
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4.

Discovery in this case is continuing. The Hospital itself is conducting

massive discovery. In this month alone (March 2004), the Hospital has issued no fewer
than 7 medical records subpoenas. Late last month, it deposed a physician treating the
decedent's widow. It intends to take the deposition of one of the decedent's treating
physicians on March 24. (See subpoena and deposition notices attached to plaintiffs'
memorandum opposing defendant's summary judgment motion).
5.

On March 18, 2004 plaintiffs caused to be served on the Hospital a Notice

of Deposition of Linda Wright and a Rule 30(b)(6) Notice of Deposition of other Hospital
representatives. (See Exhibits UA" and "B", attached).
6.

On March 19, the Hospital's counsel sent a letter to plaintiffs' counsel

stating: "Defendant will not be producing Rule 30(b)(6) deponents or Linda Wright for
deposition on March 31, 2004, unless ordered to do so by Judge Atherton." (See
Exhibit "C", attached).
7.

On March 23, plaintiffs' counsel invited the Hospital's counsel to reverse

her position and to make Linda Wright and the Rule 30(b)(6) deponents available for
the scheduled March 31 depositions. (See Exhibit "D", attached).
8.

The Hospital and its counsel have not reversed their position as to the

Linda Wright and Rule 30(b)(6) depositions.
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ARGUMENT
I.
THERE IS NO JUSTIFIABLE BASIS FOR
THE HOSPITAL'S POSITION
This Court's minute entry invites, rather than precludes, discovery into the
accuracy and truthfulness of Linda Wright's affidavit assertions.

Plaintiffs have no way

of ascertaining the accuracy of those assertions without deposing Ms. Wright and/or
other Hospital representatives having knowledge or information concerning the
dissemination and use of the incident reports in question.
This Court has not precluded discovery of facts surrounding the incident reports.
Although a discovery plan and order filed last Fall suggests that fact discovery was to
have been completed by January 15, 2004, the parties, by agreement, have ignored
that deadline and it has not been enforced. The deadline was rendered impracticable
partially by the continuing pendency of plaintiffs motion to compel the production of the
Hospital's incident reports. That motion, filed last October, was not decided until earlier
this month. Since January 15,2004, the Hospital has conducted all manner of
discovery, including the issuance of no fewer than 9 medical records subpoenae and
the taking of two physician depositions.
In short, discovery has not been completed. Both parties are earnestly
endeavoring to discover facts they believe will help them win this case. Some of those
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facts are.believed to be hidden in the Hospital's incident reports concerning patient
Gary Cannon's fall and death. There is no just reason why plaintiffs should not be
allowed to conduct discovery to ascertain the legitimacy of the Hospital's claimed
privilege.

II.
THE HOSPITAL'S STONEWALLING APPEARS
TO BE DRIVEN BY IMPROPER MOTIVES.
Immediately upon receipt of the minute entry, plaintiffs took steps to arrange the
deposition of Linda Wright and a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of hospital representatives
having knowledge concerning the dissemination and use of the incident reports. As the
Hospital well knows, such depositions are highly time-sensitive. It is important to the
plaintiffs that information that they reveal be included in the record before the deadline
of the filing of a motion for interlocutory appeal. That deadline is twenty days after entry
of the order sought to be reviewed. The Hospital apparently has an interest in
preventing such information from being part of the record. Refusing to allow the
scheduled March 31 depositions to go forward may prevent the reviewing court from
having the benefit of information revealed in those depositions. That appears to be the
Hospital's intent and motive. Such motive is improper.
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III.
THIS COURT SHOULD COMPEL THE HOSPITAL AND ITS
COUNSEL TO COOPERATE IN DISCOVERY AND TO PAY
PLAINTIFFS5 EXPENSES IN BRINGING THIS MOTION.
Rule 37, URCP, contains provisions relating to the failure to make or cooperate
in discovery. Those provisions include the following:
(a)(2)(B) If a deponent fails to answer a question
propounded . . . under Rule 30 . . . , or a corporation . . . fails
to make a designation under Rule 3 0 ( b ) ( 6 ) . . . . . . . the
discovering party may move for an order compelling an
answer, or a designation

(a)(4)(A) If the motion is granted, or if the disclosure or
requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed,
the Court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require that the
party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or
the party or attorney advising such conduct or both of them
to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred
in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the
Court finds that the motion was filed without the movant's
first making a good faith effort to obtain the disclosures
discovery without court action, or that the opposing party's
non disclosure, response or objection was substantially
justified or that other circumstances make an award of
expenses unjust.

(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition
If a
party or an officer, director or managing agent of a party or a
person designated under Rule 30(b)(6)... to testify on
behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before the officer who is
to take the deposition, after being served with a proper
-6-

notice,... the Court in which the action is pending on
motion may make such orders in regard to the failure as are
just, and among others it may take any action authorized
under (A), (B), and (C) of subdivision (b)(2) of this Rule. In
lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the Court shall
require the party failing to act or the party's attorney or both
to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees,
caused by the failure, unless the Court finds that the failure
was substantially justified or that other circumstances make
an award of expenses unjust.
This is an appropriate occasion for both compelling discovery and for imposing
sanctions against the Hospital. After conclusorily declaring that its incident reports are
not part of its patient's medical record and were prepared and used only for care review
purposes within the contemplation of Utah's care review privilege statute, the Hospital
has now taken the position that its own declaration of privilege is beyond question or
attack. The Hospital's attempt to assume the power to preclude inquiry into the
accuracy of its assertions of privilege should not be countenanced.

CONCLUSION
This Court should compel the Hospital to promptly produce for deposition Linda
Wright and all other representatives who have information responsive to plaintiffs' Rule
30(b)(6) deposition notice. This Court should also require the Hospital and/or its
counsel to pay plaintiffs' costs and attorneys fees incurred in bringfng this motion.
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DATED this %H day of March, 2004.

Douglas G. Mortensen
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
day of March, 2004,1 caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to be delivered to the following via the means indicated:
Elizabeth L. Willey
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11 th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

W^•
J^K^
•

A

A^yvyi

PIdg Motion to Compel Discovery.0323
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U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand-Delivered
Federal Express

W\M^—

EXHIBIT "A"

Douglas G. Mortensen, USB #2329
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801)363-2244
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KATHERYN CANNON, as surviving
spouse of GARY R. CANNON,
deceased, LANE CANNON and
ROLAND CANNON, as surviving children !
and legal heirs of GARY R. CANNON,
deceased,
Plaintiffs,

NOTICE OF
DEPOSITION OF
LINDA WRIGHT
Civil No.: 020914614
Judge Judith S. Atherton

vo.

SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER, INC., JOHN AND JANE DOES
1 THROUGH X and DOE BUSINESS
ENTITIES 1 THROUGH V,
Defendants.

TO THE ABOVE NAMED PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT PLAINTIFFS WILL TAKE THE
DEPOSITION OF SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER'S RISK MANAGER,
LINDA WRIGHT, before a Certified Court Reporter and Notary Public, on March 31,

2004 at the law offices of Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson beginning at
2:00 p.m. and continuing thereafter until completed.
The deposition will be on oral interrogatories and is taken pursuant to Rule 26
and 30 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
NOTICE IS FURTHER GIVEN that the deposition of Linda Wright may be
videotaped to preserve for use at trial.
DATED this 7 ?

day of March , 2004.

Douglas G. Mortense
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P,C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the J% day of March, 2004,1 caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to be delivered to the following via the means indicated:
Elizabeth L. Willey
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11 th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

S
•
•
•

(_K^VK^>

PIdg Notice of Deposition - Unda Wright0318

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand-Delivered
Federal Express

]C)£hj

A^

AA^SVT*^

EXHIBIT "B"

Douglas G. Mortensen, USB #2329
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801)363-2244
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KATHERYN CANNON, as surviving
spouse of GARY R. CANNON,
deceased, LANE CANNON and
•
ROLAND CANNON, as surviving children
and legal heirs of GARY R. CANNON,
deceased,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

RULE 30 (b)(6) NOTICE OF
DEPOSITION OF SALT LAKE
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
REPRESENTATIVE(S)

Civil No.: 020914614
Judge Judith S. Atherton

SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL
'
CENTER, INC., JOHN AND JANE DOES
1 THROUGH X and DOE BUSINESS
ENTITIES 1 THROUGH V,
Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6), URCP, plaintiffs hereby gives notice of their intent to
depose:
1.

Each person who has knowledge or information as to the identity of each
person who has seen or may have seen the incident report(s) which Salt

LaKe Regional Medical Center has refused to produce in this action;
2.

Each and every person who has at any time seen the incident reports Salt
Lake Regional Medical Center has refused to produce in this aqtion
pertaining to the fall on or about May 18, 2001 of patient Gary R. Cannon,

before a Certified Court Reporter and Notary Public, on March 31, 2004 at the law
offices of Matheson, Mortensen, Oisen & Jeppson beginning at 2:30 p.m. and
continuing thereafter until completed.
NOTICE IS FURTHER GIVEN that these depositions may be videotaped to
preserve for use at trial.
DATED this t ^

day of March , 2004.

Mortensen
MArTHfiSQI^
Attorneys.for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the /ff day of March, 2004,1 caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to be delivered to the following via the means indicated:
Elizabeth L. Willey
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

/
•
•
•

(j^XAAS—>

Plda Notice of Deoosition - SL Rea Med Ctr ReDS.0318

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand-Delivered
Federal Express

*JL^J^UAA*JL*~-—*

EXHIBIT "C

LAW OFFICES
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR
POST OFFICE BOX 45000
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-5000
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Elizabeth Willey

to contact writer:
(801)322-9278
ewllley@scmlaw.com

March 19,2004

Douglas G. Mortensen
Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Re:

Gary R. Cannon v. Salt Lake Regional Medical Ctr.

Dear Douglas:
I am in receipt today of the following:
-L- ---Rule3JQL(bX^^
Center Representative(s); and
2.
Notice of Deposition of Linda Wright
These depositions have been scheduled for March 31, 2004. The 30 (b)(6) Notice
specifically asks to depose "each and every individual who has at any time seen the incident
reports Salt Lake Regional Medical Center has refused to produce in this action..." The
Notice of Linda Wright gives no specific purpose for her deposition. Since Linda Wright, is
the Risk Manager at Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, and was not'a care giver for
decedent, it is assumed that the purpose of her deposition is to question her also about the
subject incident report. Please inform me if you intend to depose Linda Wright for any other
purpose.
As you will recall, Judge Atherton denied your Motion to Compel Discovery and
issued a Minute Entry in this matter wherein she held that the subject incident report was
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privileged and therefore not discoverable." Based on Judge Athertoh's ruling, please be
advised that defendant will not be producing Rule 30 (b)(6) deponents or Linda Wright for
deposition on March 31, 2004, unless ordered to do so by Judge Atherton.
Very truly yours,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Elizabeth Willey

020440-0051\ELWH5108.Wpd

EXHIBIT "D"

MAXHESON, MOHTENSEN, Q L S E N 8C JEPPSON
a Professional Corporation
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
648 EAST FIRST SOUTH
SALT LAKE Crrr, UTAH 84102
TELEPHONE (801) 363-2244
TELECOPIER (8.01) 363-2261
D O U G L A S G. M O R T E N S E N
March 2 3 , 2 0 0 4

WRITER'S VOICE MAIL:
954-5601
WRITER'S E-MAIL:
dmort@mmojlaw.coin

BY E-MAIL ewHlev@scmtew.com
AND FACSIMILE - (801) 363-0400
Elizabeth L Wifley
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11 th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Re:

Gary R. Cannon v. Salt Lake Regional Medical Center

Dear Elizabeth:
Judge Atherton's minute entry ruling appears to invite, not preclude, discovery
into whether Linda Wright's affidavit assertions are true or false. There is nothing in the
minute entry suggesting the plaintiffs are precluded from undertaking to discover the
identity of persons who have seen the incident reports or the purposes for which the
reports have been seen.
BTTRIslefter, which I am both taxing a n d ^ m ^ I n g T o you this afternoon, I invite
you to reverse the position taken in your March 19 letter to me in which you announce
that "defendant will not be producing Rule 30(b)(6) deponents or Linda Wright for
deposition on March 31,2004, unless ordered to do so by Judge Atherton." Your office
assistant informs me that you are expected to be back in the office this afternoon and in
a position to receive this communication. If you do not accept this invitation and
communicate to my office by 10:00 a.m. tomorrow morning (either by telephone, e-mail
or fax) an indication that Linda Wright and the 30(b)(6) deponents Will be made
available for the scheduled March 31 depositions, I will file a motion to compel seeking
sanctions in the form of costs and attorneys fees.
Very truly yours,

v-

DGM/ab
iefterto Qzabettr Wilfey.0323

Douglas G. Mortefhsen

n m i n l a Q f2

Exhibit I

DAVID W. SLAGLE - A2975
ELIZABETH L. WILLEY - A5639
BRADLEY R. BLACKHAM -A8703
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
Salt Lake Regional Medical Center
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KATHERYN CANNON, as surviving
spouse of GARY R. CANNON, deceased,
LANE CANNON and ROLAND
CANNON, as surviving children and legal
heirs of GARY R. CANNON, deceased,

DEFENDANT SALT LAKE REGIONAL
MEDICAL C E N T E R ,
INC.'S
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL
DISCOVERY AND FOR SANCTIONS

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 020914614
vs.

Judge Judith S.H. Atherton

SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER, INC., JOHN AND JANE DOES
1 THROUGH X AND DOE BUSINESS
ENTITIES 1 THROUGH V,
Defendants.
Defendant Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc., ("Salt Lake Regional") submits the
following memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to plaintiffs' motion to compel
discovery and for sanctions.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
1.

This is a medical malpractice case arising from treatment and care rendered to

decedent Gary Cannon while he was a patient at Salt Lake Regional from May 16,2001 through
May 21,2001. (Compl.)
2.

Plaintiffs commenced this action by filing suit on or around December 16, 2002.

(Compl.)
3.

On January 6,2003, plaintiffs served their first set of interrogatories and requests for

production of documents on Salt Lake Regional. (Cert, of Serv. of Pis.' First Set of Interrogs. and
Req. for Prod, of Docs.)
4.

Plaintiffs' First Set of Requests for Production of Documents includes a request for

each incident report that may exist regarding Mr. Cannon's fall while he was a patient at Salt Lake
Regional.
5.

J(P1S.'

First Req. for Prod, of Docs.)

On January 23, 2003, Salt Lake Regional served its first set of interrogatories and

requests for production of documents on plaintiffs. (Cert of Disc, of Salt Lake Reg'l First Set of
Interrogs. and Req. for Prod, of Docs.)
6.

On January 31,2003, the Court signed and entered an initial stipulated scheduling

order for this case. (Attorney Planning Meeting Report and Stipulated Scheduling Order.)
7.

On January 31,2003, Salt Lake Regional served its Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures

on plaintiffs. Included in Salt Lake Regional's initial disclosures are the names of a registered nurse
and a nurse assistant who provided treatment and care to Mr. Cannon while he was a patient at Salt
Lake Regional. (Salt Lake Reg'l Initial Disclosures.)
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8.

On February 20, 2003, Salt Lake Regional served its Second Set of Requests for

Production of Documents on plaintiffs. (Cert, of Disc, of Salt Lake Reg'l Second Set of Req. for
Prod, of Docs.).
9.

On February 24,2003, Salt Lake Regional served its responses to plaintiffs' First Set

of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents on plaintiffs. (Cert, of Serv. of Salt
Lake Reg'l Answers to Pis.' First Set of Merrogs. and Req. for Prod, of Docs.)
10.

Salt Lake Regional objected to plaintiffs' request for "each incident report" on the

grounds of peer review and the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-1 et seq. (1953 as amended.)
(Salt Lake Reg'l Answers to Pis.' First Req. for Prod, of Docs.)
11.

On March 11,2003, plaintiffs served their responses to Salt Lake Regional's Second

Set of Requests for Production of Documents on Salt Lake Regional. (Cert of Serv. of Pis.' Resp.
to Salt Lake Reg'l Second Set of Req. for Prod, of Docs.)
12.

On March 17,2003, counsel for Salt Lake Regional sent plaintiffs' counsel a letter

reminding him that plaintiffs' responses to Salt Lake RegionaPs First Set of Interrogatories and
Requests for Production of Documents were overdue and inquiring as to when Salt Lake Regional
could expect to receive plaintiffs' responses. (3/17/03 letter, attached as Exhibit A.)
13.

On May 1, 2003, counsel for Salt Lake Regional sent a second letter to plaintifls'

counsel inquiring as to when Salt Lake Regional could expect to receive plaintiffs' responses to Salt
Lake Regional's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents. (5/1/03
Letter, attached as Exhibit B.) "
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14.

On May 9,2003, plaintiffs served their responses to Salt Lake Regional's First Set

of Interrogatories and Requests for Production ofDocuments on Salt Lake Regional. (Cert, of Serv.
of Pis.' Resp. to Salt Lake Reg'l First Set of Interrogs. and Req. for Prod, of Docs.)
15.

On September 23, 2003, the Court signed and entered an amended stipulated

scheduling order to accommodate the parties' stipulated request for more time to complete
discovery. (Order on Am. Planning Meeting Report and Stipulated Scheduling Order.)
16.

On October 24, 2003, plaintiffs served their motion to compel production of any

incident report that may exist with respect to Mr. Cannon's fall, on Salt Lake Regional. (Pis' First
Motion to Compel.)
17.

On November 17,2003, Salt Lake Regional served its memorandum in opposition

to plaintiffs' motion to compel production of any existing incident report concerning Mr. Cannon's
fall on plaintiffs. Attached to Salt Lake Regional's memorandum is the affidavit of Linda Wright,
who is the Risk Manager at Salt Lake Regional. (Salt Lake Reg'l Mem. in Opp'n to Pis.' First Mot.
to Compel)
18.

In its memorandum in opposition, Salt Lake Regional pointed out that the medical

records are a contemporaneous record of events and that plaintiffs could depose any ofMr. Cannon's
health care providers about the treatment and care rendered to Mr. Cannon while he was a patient
at Salt Lake Regional. (Salt Lake Reg'l Mem. in Opp'n to Pis.' First Mot to Compel.)
19.

On November 21, 2003, Salt Lake Regional served its Third Set of Requests for

Production ofDocuments on plaintiffs. (Cert, of Disc, of Salt Lake Reg'l Third Set of Req. for Prod,
of Docs.)
iv

20.

On December 5,2003, plaintiff served their reply memorandum in support of their

motion to compel production of any existing incident reports on Salt Lake Regional. (Pis/ Reply
Mem. in Supp. of First Mot. to Compel.)
21.

In their reply memorandum, plaintiffs argued that the deposition ofLinda Wright may

be necessary to determine whether or not any existing incident reports are protected under Utah's
care review privilege. (Pis.' Reply Mem. in Supp. of First Mot to Compel.)
22.

OnDecember 22,2003, plaintiffs served their Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures on Salt

Lake Regional. (Pis.'Initial Disclosures.)
23.

On March 12,2004, Salt Lake Regional served its Designation of Expert Witnesses

on plaintiffs. (Salt Lake Reg'l Designation of Expert Witnesses.)
24.

On January 12,2004, counsel for Salt Lake Regional sent plaintiffs' counsel a letter

reminding him that plaintiffs' responses to Salt Lake Regional's Third Set of Requests for
Production of Documents were overdue and inquiring as to when Salt Lake Regional could expect
to see plaintiffs' responses. (1/12/04 Letter, attached as Exhibit C.)
25.

On March 4,2004, the Court issued a signed Minute Entry denying plaintiffs' motion

to compel production of any existing incident reports. The Court concluded in its Minute Entry that
such reports are privileged. (Minute Entry, copy attached as Exhibit D.)
26.

On March 11, 2004, Salt Lake Regional served supplemental Rule 26(a)(1) initial

disclosures on plaintiffs. Included in Salt Lake Regional's supplemental disclosures is the identity
of a therapist who was working on the unit at Salt Lake Regional where Mr. Cannon was a patient.
(Salt Lake Reg'l Supp. Initial Disclosures.)
v

27.

On March 12,2004, counsel for Salt Lake Regional sent plaintiffs' counsel a letter

and a proposed order reflecting the ruling from the Court's Minute Entry. (3/12/04 letter and
proposed order, attached as Exhibit E.)
28.

Plaintiffs' counsel has filed an objection to the proposed order on the Court's Minute

Entry. (Pis.' Objection to Order on Minute Entry.)
29.

On March 17,2004, counsellor Salt Lake Regional sent plaintiffs' counsel a second

letter inquiring as to when Salt Lake Regional could expect to see plaintiffs' responses to Salt Lake
Regional's Third Set of Requests for Production of Documents. (3/17/04 Letter, attached as Exhibit
F.)
30.

On March 18,2004, plaintiffs served notices of depositions of (1) Linda Wright; (2)

each person who has knowledge or information as to the identity of each person who has seen or
may have seen any existing incident report; and (3) each and every person who has seen any existing
incident report. (Pis.' Rule 30(b)(6) Notice of Dep. of Salt Lake Reg'l Representatives; Pis.' Notice
of Dep. of Linda Wright)
31.

On March 19,2004, counsel for Salt Lake Regional sent plaintiffs' counsel a letter

advising him that, pursuant to the Court's Minute Entry regarding the privileged nature of any
existing incident reports, the hospital would not produce Ms. Wright or other Salt Lake Regional
Hospital representatives for depositionregardmgprivileged matters without an orderfromthe Court
(3/19/04 Letter, attached as Exhibit G.)
32-

Salt Lake Regional has deposed the following individuals:
Dr. Ronald Ward

Gary Cannon5 s treating physician

3/24/04
vi

Dr. Diana Banks
Kathryn Cannon
Lane Cannon
Roland Cannon
33.

2/27/04
10/21/03
10/21/03
10/21/03

Kathryn Cannon's treating physician
Plaintiff
Plaintiff
Plaintiff

Plaintiffs have not taken any depositions in this case.
ARGUMENT
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SALT LAKE REGIONAL REASONABLY RELIED ON THE COURT'S MINUTE
ENTRY AND CASE LAW IN REFUSING TO PRODUCE WITNESSES FOR
DEPOSITION QUESTIONING ABOUT PRIVILEGED MATTERS
The Court's Minute Entry provides Salt Lake Regional with a solid basis for denying

plaintiffs' requests to depose witnesses about privileged matters. Plaintiffs first requested the
privileged incident reports over a year ago in their first set of document requests. When Salt Lake
Regional objected to plaintiffs' request, plaintiffs filed a motion to compel. Salt Lake Regional
opposed plaintiffs' motion with sound legal authority and the affidavit testimony of Linda Wright.
In its memorandum, Salt Lake Regional pointed out that plaintiffs have access to Mr. Cannon's
medical records, which are a contemporaneous account of Mr. Cannon's treatment and care at the
hospital. Salt Lake Regional also pointed out that plaintiffs could depose any of Mr. Cannon's
health care providers about the treatment and care they rendered to Mr. Cannon while he was a
patient at Salt Lake Regional.
Rather than pursuefiuitfiil,nonprivileged sources of information, plaintiffs instead chose to
forge ahead with their efforts to discover privileged materials. In their reply memorandum in
support of their motion to compel incident reports, plaintiffs indicated that Linda Wright may need
to be deposed to establish that the care review privilege applies in this case. The Court denied

1

plaintiffs' motion in a Minute Entry without hearing oral argument The Court concluded in its
Minute Entry that any existing incident reports are privileged. Importantly, the Court did not
conclude that Ms. Wright needed to be deposed to establish that the care review privilege applies.
Despite the Court's ruling on the issue, plaintiffs persist in their efforts to discover privileged
information about Salt Lake RegionaFs care review process and any existing incident reports. Salt
Lake Regional reasonably relied on the Court's prior Minute Entry in denying plaintiffi'„cfintinued
attempts to obtain privileged materials. Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure limits
discovery to matters that are not privileged. UtahR. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The Court has determined that,
any incident reports that may exist are privileged. Therefore, the discovery of any existing incident
reports is not allowed under Rule 26.
Furthermore, requests for discovery of information related to incident reports, such as the
deposition of individuals who have either seen the incident reports or have been involved in the care
review process are not permitted under Rule 26 because such requests are not reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible, nonprivileged information. See Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)
(limiting discovery to information that is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence).
Case law from other jurisdictions supports Salt Lake RegkmaPs position on this issue. The
Georgia Supreme Court has held that even basic information such as whether a medical review,
committee was held and who attended that meeting is privileged information. Hollowell v. Jove, 279
S.E.2d 430, 434 (Ga. 1981). Similarly, a Florida District Court of Appeal cited and quoted with
approval another Florida Court decision for the following statement of law: ccWhile the names of
2

the committee members are not specifically protected by the statute, the release of the names would
neither be relevant nor lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Mount Sinai Med. Cfr. of
Greater Miami, Inc. v. Bernstein, 645 So. 2d 530,532 (Fla. Dist Ct App. 1994).
Yet another court has reviewed various rulings on the issue and concluded, 'The teachings
ofthese cases is that committee proceedings-in all respects-are inviolate and nondiscoverable." Doe
v. UnumLifelns. Co. of Am., S9\F.Supp. 607,610 {N&

That court analogized the peer

review process to a black hole and concluded that what goes into the peer review committee does
not come out. Id. While the court recognized that the identities ofhealth care providers who are fact
witnesses can be discovered and that those individuals could be deposed about their personal
involvement in treating the patient, the peer review privilege prohibited any discovery aimed at
determining who may have attended or given testimony at any peer review meeting. Id. at 611; see
also Eubanks v. Ferrier, 267 S.E.2d 230,233 (Ga. 1980) (holding that while a physician could be
deposed about his treatment of the patient, he could not be deposed about any matter arising out of
his service on the hospital's medical review committee); Munroe Reg'IMed. Ctr. v. Bountree, 721
So. 2d 1220, 1223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (allowing a fact witness to be deposed as to what he
or she saw or heard during surgery but refusing to allow questions as to what that person told the
hospital's peer review committee).
Here, plaintiffs served notice of deposition of Salt Lake RegionaPs Risk Manager, Linda
Wright. Plaintiffs have clearly indicated that the only reason they want to depose Ms. Wright is for
the purpose of questioning her about the hospital's carejceview process and any existing incident
reports. See Pis.' Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Compel Disc, of Hosp.'s Incident Report, p. 5;
3

Pis/ Mot to Compel Disc, and for Sanctions, p. 5. Plaintiffs have also served notice of their intent
to depose (1) each person who has knowledge or information as to the identity of each person who
has seen any existing incident report concerning Mr. Camion's fall; and (2) each and every person
who has seen any existing incident report concerning Mr. Cannon's fall. Plaintiffs' intent with
regard to these proposed depositions is evident on the face of the notice of depositions.
As pointed out in the cases cited above, the matters sought to be discovered during the
depositions at issue are privileged. While plaintiffs certainly have the right to depose Mr. Cannon's
health care providers about the treatment and care they rendered to Mr. Cannon while he was a
patient at Salt Lake Regional, they have not yet bothered to do so. See Bernstein, 645 So. 2d at 532
(noting that plaintiffs failed to pose any interrogatories about nonprivileged matters involving the
treatment and care provided to the patient).
In fact, plaintiffs have not taken a single deposition despite the passage of over 15 months
since this case was commenced and having knowledge of the names of at least some of the health
care providers involved in this case. Far from being unjustified, Salt Lake Regional's refusal to
provide witnesses for questioning about privileged matters is supported by case law and was made
in reasonable reliance on this Court's Minute Entry. For these reasons, plaintiffs' motion to compel
should be denied.
II.

SALT LAKE REGIONAL HAS NO IMPROPER MOTIVE FOR REFUSING TO
PRODUCE WITNESSES FOR DEPOSITION QUESTIONING ABOUT
PRIVILEGED MATTERS
Plaintiffs presume to ascribe improper motive for Salt Lake Regional's refusal to allow its

employees to be questioned about privileged matters. Plaintiffs specifically argue that Salt Lake
4

Regional is somehow trying to preclude plaintiffs from including evidence in the record on appeal.
Plaintiffs' accusation fails for several reasons. First, plaintiffs' argument fails to acknowledge that
the actions of counsel for Salt Lake Regional demonstrate an absence of improper motive* A signed
minute entry maybe considered afinalorder forpurposes of appeal "inappropriate ckcumstancesj
Swensen Assoc. Architects, P.C. v. State, 889 P.2d 415, 417 (Utah 1994). Specifically, a signed
minute entry is not considered a final appealable order when further action, such as the preparation
and signing of an order, are contemplated by the express language of the minute entry. See id; State
v. Leatherbury, 2003 UT2, \ 9,65 P.3d 1180.
Regardless of whether or not the Court's signed Minute Entry constitutes a final appealable
order, counsel for Salt Lake Regional proceeded to prepare a written order for approval and
signature. Plaintiffs' counsel did not approve the order as to form and instead filed an objection to
the order on the Court's Minute Entry. If, in fact, an order reflecting the Court's rulingin its Minute*
Entry must be signed and entered by the Court, the 20-day time period for filing a petition for
interlocutory appeal would not begin to run until the final, appealable order has been entered. In any
event, Salt Lake RegionaPs preparation of a proposed order is inconsistent with plaintiffs' charge
that Salt Lake Regional is trying to run out the clock on plaintiffs' efforts to supplement Hie record
on appeal with new evidence.
Finally, plaintiffs' argument fails because it presumes that Utah's appellate courts would
consider new evidence on appeal that was not previously considered by this Court. Plaintiffs'
argument seems to be that they intend to support an appeal of the Court's Minute Entry with new
evidence that was not considered by this Court when it issued the Minute Entry. Utah's appellate
5

courts have consistently refused to consider new evidence on appeal. See Low v. Bonacci, 788 P.2d
512,513 (Utah 1990); Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843,847 (Utah Ct App. 1994). Ifplaintiffe
want to appeal this Court's Minute Entry, they must do so on the same evidence that was presented
to this Court prior to the issuance of its Minute Entry. Therefore, Salt Lake RegionaTs refusal to
permit deposition questioning about privileged matters has not unfairly limited the record on appeal.
In conclusion, Salt Lake Regional's sole motive inrefusing to allow deposition questioning
about the incident reports and care review process is to preserve the privileged nature of such
information. Plaintiffs' allegation that Salt Lake Regional has some improper motive for refusing
to agree to the proposed depositions at issue is both unfounded and unfair.
DDE.

SANCTIONS AGAINST SALT LAKE REGIONAL WOULD BE UNJUST
Plaintiffs request for sanctions against Salt Lake Regional is not warranted. Rule 37 of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that sanctions are not proper if the actions of the party
opposing the motion to compel were substantially justified. Utah R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). In addition,
sanctions are not proper if "other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust." Id.
Here, Salt Lake Regional's refusal to allow the noticed depositions was substantially justified
by the Court's Minute Entry. Because the Court denied plaintiffs' motion to compel production of
incid^r^orts^
only guide to the Court's intent. Despite plaintiffs' argument that the deposition of Linda Wright
may be necessary to establish that the care review privilege applies in this case, the Court ruled that
any existing incident reports are privileged. The Court's actions imply that further discovery was
neither necessary for a decision on the matter nor invited. Salt Lake Regional Hospital reasonably
6

relied on the Court's Minute Entry and its actions in denying plaintiffs' requests for depositions of
persons with knowledge of the hospital's care review process or any incident report that may exist.
Because Salt Lake Regional's actions were substantially justified by the Court's Minute Entry and
actions, sanctions would not be appropriate.
Plaintiffs' own actions in this case also make their request for sanctions against Salt Lake
Regional unjust and unreasonable. Plaintiffs do not come to the Court with clean hands in the
discovery process of this case. Although plaintiffs are required to serve their initial disclosures
within 14 days of the Rule 26(f) attorney planning conference, plaintiffs did not serve their initial
disclosures until almost eleven months after the Court signed the initial stipulated scheduling order*
Plaintiffs have also been inexcusably late in providing responses to Salt Lake Regional's
discovery requests. Counsel for Salt Lake Regional sent plaintiff's counsel two letters inquiring as
to plaintiffs' overdue responses to Salt Lake Regional'sfirstset of interrogatories and requests for
production of documents. Plaintiffsfinallyserved their responses to those discovery requests over
two and a half months late. As of this date, plaintiffs have failed to serve responses to Salt Lake
Regional's third request for production of documents despite the passage of four months and two
lettersfromcounsel for Salt Lake Regional inquiring as to when Salt Lake Regional can expect to
receive the overdue responses.
Finally, plaintiffs' have been less than diligent in fulfilling their duty to prosecute this case.
See Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368,1370 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
("Plaintiffs are required 'to prosecute their claims with due diligence, or accept the penalty of
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dismissal.'" (citation omitted)). Plaintiffs have failed to take a single deposition despite the passage
of over 15 months since this case was commenced. In contrast, Salt Lake Regional has taken five
depositions. Simply put, plaintiffs' conduct not only makes their request for sanctions against Salt
Lake Regional unjust, but it begs the question of whether sanctions should be imposed against
plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
The Court's Minute Entry and actions, in conjunction with case law on the issue, provide Salt
Lake Regional with solid bases for denying plaintiffs' requests for depositions regarding privileged
information. Salt Lake Regional's sole motive in denying plaintiffs' requests for the depositions at
issue to protect privileged care review information. Because Salt Lake Regional reasonably relied
on the Court's actions and Minute Entry in denying plaintiffs' requests for the depositions at issue,
sanctions against Salt Lake Regional* would not be appropriate. Finally, plaintiffs' own conduct
throughout the course of this case makes sanctions against Salt Lake Regional unjust
DATED this 3/~

day of March, 2004.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By ijAac6&tf7Z\

TJlc^jLA^^rJ

David W^Slagle
ElizabeffiL.Wffley
Bradley R. Blackham
Attorneys for Defendant
Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc.
N:\20440\5l\PLEADING\compeI opposition 2 memcwpd
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I am employed by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for
Defendant, Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, that I had hand delivered the attached DEFENDANT
SALT LAKE MEDICAL CENTER, INC'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY AND FOR SANCTIONS (Case
Number 020914614, Third District Courts Salt Lake County, State of Utah) upon the parties listed
below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
BbugTas* G; WorBSsen
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for Plaintiff

£t

and causing the-same to. be hand delivered, on the 3 t - day of March, 2004,

EXHIBIT "A"

LAW OFFICES

SNOW, CHEISTENSEN & MAHTINEAU
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
lO EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR
POST OFFICE BOX 4 5 0 0 0
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 4 5 - 5 0 0 0
TELEPHONE (80l> 521-9OO0
E L I Z A B E T H L. WILLEY

FACSIMILE (aot)

363-04oo

HTTFV/WWW.SCMLAW.COM

TO

COKTACT WRITER:

<•©»> 3 2 2 - 3 2 7 8
ewtlleydscmlaw.com

March 17, 2003

Douglas G. Mortensen
Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson
648 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re:

Gary R. Cannon v. Salt Lake Regional Medical Center

Dear Doug:
Thank you for responding to defendant's Second Set of Requests for Production of
Documents. I also note, that your clientsr responses to defendant's First Set of Interrogatories
and Requests for Production of Documents are overdue. Please let know when I should expect to
receive those responses. Thank you for your help and cooperation in this matter.
Very truly yours,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

^)^7LElizabethL. Willey
ELW:sn
N:U044(A51\CORI^S\Mortcnscn-030517-^covray requesto.wpd

EXHIBIT "B"

LAW OFFICES

SNOW, CHHISTENSEN & MAETESTEAIT
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
IO EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR
POST OFFICE BOX 4 5 0 0 0

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 4 5 - 5 0 0 0
TELEPHONE (SOl) S 2 I - 9 0 0 0
ELIZABETH L WILLEY

FACSIMILE <eoi> 3S3-o«oo
HTTP://WWW.SCMLAW.COM

TO

CONTACT wane*

(•©>) 3 2 2 - 9 2 7 S

ewUleydscmtaw.com

May 1,2003

Douglas G. Mortensen
Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson
648 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re:

Gary R. Cannon v. Salt Lake Regional Medical Center

Dear Doug:
My records indicate that your responses to defendant's First Set of Interrogatories and
Requests for Production of Documents are now two months overdue. Please let me know when I
should expect to receive those responses.
Thank you for your help and cooperation in this matter.
Very truly yours,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Elizabeth L.Willey
ELW.sn
NA2044(Ml\CORRES\MQrtenscn-030501-Fns Set of Discovery Requests.wpd

EXHIBIT "C

LAW OFFICES

Ssrow, CHEISTENTSEN & MAETENEAIT
A P R O F E S S I O N A L CORPORATION
IO EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR
POST OFFICE BOX 4 5 0 0 0
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 4 5 - 5 0 0 0
TELEPHONE (80t) 52I-9000
E L I Z A B E T H L- W I L L E T

FACSIMILE ( S O I ) 3 6 3 - O « O O
HTTP^AYWW.SCMLAW.COM

TO

te©*>

CONTACT WRITES:
322-9278

ewllldy@scmlaw.com

January 12, 2004

Douglas G. Mortensen
Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson
648 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re:

Gary R. Cannon v. Salt Lake Regional Medical Center

Dear Doug:
In reviewing the above tile, it appears that plaintiffs' Responses to defendant Salt Lake
Regional Medical Center's Third Set of Request for Production of Documents is overdue. Please
let me know when I should expect to receive those responses.
Very truly yours,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Elizabeth L. Willey
ELW:sn
\\Scm-probw\Documaio\020440-005I\SN\40602.wpd

EXHIBIT "D"

^LEO 0ISTB5CT GOSJBT
Third Judicial District

MAR-420M
SALT LAKE COUNTY
Deputy Cferk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KATHERYN GANNON, as surviving
spouse of GARY R. CANNON,
deceased, LANE CANNON and
ROLAND CANNON, as surviving
children and legal heirs of
GARY R. CANNON, deceased.

:

MINUTE ENTRY

:

CASE NO.

020914614

:

Plaintiffs,
:

vs.
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER, INC., JOHN AND JANE
DOES 1 THROUGH X, and DOE
BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 THROUGH V,
Defendants•

:
:
:

This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs1 Motion to
Compel, dated October 24, 2003. This Court has reviewed arguments
of counsel and hereby denies plaintiffs1 Motion.
Pursuant to Benson, exrel. Benson v. IHC Hospitals, Inc.,. 866
P.2d 537 (Utah 1993), the Supreme Court equates the peer review
privilege with the care review ^privilege. Accordingly, reports are
privileged if they are "prepared specifically to be submitted for
review purposes." Id. The only evidence presented in this case is
the Affidavit of Linda Wright. Ms. Wright

asserts that the

"Incident reports are created specifically for submission to the
[care review department] , " and that "Incident reports are not

CANNON V. SALT LAKE
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
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MINUTE ENTRY

created or used for any purpose other than for evaluating and
improving the health care rendered to patients at Salt Lake
Regional Medical Center....

Incident reports are not included as

part of the patientfs medical records."
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, this Court
finds that the reports are privileged.
Dated this T

day of March, 2004.

STATE OF UTAH
)
County of Salt Lake
j s&
lf the undersigned, Clark of the District Court* Stat$ of
Utah, Salt Lake County, Satt Lake Department da hereby
certify that the annexed and foregoing Is a true and M
copy of an original document on file in my office as such
sesa my hand end seal of said Court This J2L£5»
v^SSS^s^^

U\ £.;*?£>*

NS,'

CLERK OF COURT

i

Deputy
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this lf-fck> day of March,
2004:

Douglas G. Mortensen
Attorney for Plaintiffs
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
David W. Slagle
Elizabeth L. Willey
Bradley R. Blackham
Attorneys for Defendant

EXHIBIT 'E'

LAW OFFICES

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR
POST OFFICE BOX 45000
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-5000
TELEPHONE (801) 521-9000
FACSIMILE (801) 363-0400
HTTP://WWW.SCMLAW.COM

Elizabeth Willey

to contact writer:
(801)322-9278
ewfney@scmiaw.com

March 12, 2004

Douglas G. Mortensen
Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Re:

Gary R. Cannon v. Salt Lake Regional Medical Ctr.

Dear Douglas:
Enclosed please find the original Proposed Order as to the Minute Entry
made by Judge Atherton. If it meets with your approval, please execute it and
return it to me for filing with the court. Should you have any questions, please feel
free to contact me.
Very truly yours,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Elizabeth Willey
ELW:sn
Enclosure
020440-Q051\SNU4S91.wpd

DAVID W. SLAGLE (2975)
ELIZABETH L. WHXEY (5639)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARHNEAU
Attorneys for Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc.
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KATHRYN CANNON, as surviving spouse
of GARY R. CANNON, deceased, LANE
CANNON and ROLAND CANNON, as
surviving children and legal heirs of GARY
R. CANNON, deceased,

ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER, INC., JOHN AND JANE DOES
1 THROUGH X AND DOE BUSINESS
ENTITIES 1 THROUGH V,

Case No. 020914614
Judge Judith S.H Afherton

Defendants.

The above entitled matter having come before me Court on Plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel
Discovery and the Court having reviewed the Motion and Defendant's Opposition thereto, the Court
is fully advised in the premises and for good cause therefore appearing,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs' Motion to
Compel Discovery is DENIED.
SO ORDERED this

day of

, 2004.

BY THE COURT

Honorable Judge Judith S. H. Atherton
THIRD DISTRICT COURT

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Douglas S. Mortensen
Attorneys for Plaintiff

\\Scm-prolanADocumenl3\02O44O-00Sl\SM44434.wpd
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LAW OFFICES

S N O W , CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR
POST OFFICE BOX 45000
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-5000
TELEPHONE (801) 521-9000
FACSIMILE (801) 363-0400
HTTP'J/WWW.SCMLAW.COM

to contact writer:
(801)322-9278
ewiffey@scmlaw.com

Elizabeth WHIey

March 17, 2004

Douglas G. Mortensen
MathesonxMortensen^ Olsen & Jeppspn
648 Fast 100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Re:

GaryR. Cannon v. Salt Lake Regional Medical Ctr.

Dear Douglas:
This letter is in response to your letter dated March 11, 2004, regarding our letter to
you indicating that we were going to subpoena the records of Dr. Ronald Ward pertaining to
plaintiff Katheryn Cannon. It is my understanding that Ms. Cannon has placed her physical
condition at issue in this case. Therefore, I believe I have the right to obtain medical records
frbm her treating physicians. To that effect, I am enclosing a Release for Dr. Ronald Ward,
that I request that plaintiff Katheryn Cannon sign. Please let me know if you refuse to have
Ms. Cannon sign this Release. If I do not receive the executed Release by March 31, 2004,
I will go forward in filing a Motion to Compel.
Additionally* my records indicate that you have not responded to defendant's Third
Set of Requests for Production of Documents. If you intend to drop the claims for
psychological damage and expense for plaintiffs Lane Cannon and Roland Cannon^ I do not
need them to sign the Release forms. However, if they plan on placing their mental health at
issue in this matter, I have the right to review those providers that they sought carefrom,and
whose billing statements are part of their special damage claim. Those requests for
documents were due on December 24, 2003. Please let me know within the next week your
intent in producing the requested documents.

March 17,2004
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Thanfc you for your help and cooperation in this matter.
Very truly yours,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Elizabeth Willey
ELW:s»
Enclosure
020440-0051\SN\44S41.wpd

EXHIBIT 'G

LAW OFFICES
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR
POST OFFICE BOX 45000
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84145-5000
TELEPHONE (801) 521-9000
FACSIMILE (S01) 363-0400
HTTP-J/WWW SCMLAW COM

Elizabeth Wiliey

to contact writer:
(801) 322-9278
ewilley@scmiaw.com

March 19,2004

Douglas G. Mortensen
Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Re:

Gary R. Cannon v. Salt Lake Regional Medical Ctr.

Dear Douglas:
I am in receipt today of the following:
1.
2.

Rule 30 (b)(6) Notice of Deposition of Salt Lake Regional Medical
Center Representative(s); and
Notice of Deposition of Linda Wright

These depositions have been scheduled for March 31, 2004. The 30 (b)(6) Notice
specifically asks to depose "each and every individual who has at any time seen the incident
reports Salt Lake Regional Medical Center has refused to produce in this action..." The
Notice of Linda Wright gives no specific purpose for her deposition. Since Linda Wright, is
the Risk Manager at Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, and was not a care giver for
decedent, it is assumed that the purpose of her deposition is to question her also about the
subject incident report. Please inform me if you intend to depose Linda Wright for any other
purpose.
As you will recall, Judge Atherton denied your Motion to Compel Discovery and
issued a Minute Entry in this matter wherein she held that the subject incident report was

March 19, 2004
Page 2

privileged and therefore not discoverable. Based on Judge Atherton's ruling, please be
advised that defendant will not be producing Rule 30 (b)(6) deponents or Linda Wright for
deposition on March 31, 2004, unless ordered to do so by Judge Atherton.
Very truly yours,

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Elizabeth Willey

020+40-0051\ELW\45108.wpd

Exhibit J

Douglas G. Mortensen, USB #2329

MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801)363-2244
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KATHERYNCANNONr-as surviving
spouse of GARY R. CANNON,
deceased, LANE CANNON and
ROLAND CANNON, as surviving children
and legal heirs of GARY R. CANNON,
deceased,
Plaintiffs,

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY
MEMORANDUM
SUPPORTING THEIR
MOTION TO COMPEL
DISCOVERY AND FOR
SANCTIONS
Civil No.: 020914614
Judge Judith S. Atherton

vs.
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER, INC., JOHN AND JANE DOES
1 THROUGH X and DOE BUSINESS
ENTITIES 1 THROUGH V,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs Katheryn, Lane and Roland Cannon submit this reply memorandum
supporting their motion to compel discovery and for sanctions.

IRRELEVANCE OF DEFENDANTS "MATERIAL FACTS"
Of the defendant's 33 enumerated "material facts" only those assertions
numbered 25, 27, 28,30 and 31 are remotely germane to the pending motion. All of
the other assertions are immaterial and irrelevant and should be disregarded.
In addition, plaintiffs contest the accuracy of defendant's Fact No. 21 which
asserts:
21.

In their reply memorandum, plaintiffs argued that the
deposition of Linda Wright may be necessary to
detecpniae whether or not any existing incident reports
are protected undertltah's care review privilege.

Plaintiffs reply memorandum contains no such argument. It does, however, contain
argument, supported by ample case authority that any affidavit asserting a privilege
must be accompanied by copies of the documents allegedly subject to the privilege, for
the Court's in-camera review. The plaintiffs further pointed out:
In the case cited by the Hospital, the affidavit was
accompanied not only by the documents sought to be
protected by discovery but also by the Hospital's bylaws,
rules and regulations. (952 SW.2nd at 930). Here, Ms,
Wright's affidavit is not accompanied by the incident reports
claimed to be privileged nor by the Hospital's bylaws, rules
or protocols. Without such documentation, there is no
corroboration fo the risk manager's naked assertion that
incident reports are created specifically and solely for care
review purposes.
An accompanying footnote states simply: "Even with such documents, examination of
Linda Wright under oath may necessary."
-2-

The root issue before this Court is simply whether the hospital can prevent the
plaintiffs from conducting discovery aimed at ascertaining the truth of Linda Wright's
affidavit assertions. It is plaintiffs' position that if a privilege can be conclusively
established and rendered unassailable by a simple, conclusorily worded affidavit the
pursuit for truth is in serious jeopardy.

ARGUMENT
THIS COURTS MINUTE ENTRY PROVIDES NO BASIS
FOR THE HOSPITAL'S REFUSAL TO COOPERATE IN
DISCOVERY CONCERNING THE DISSEMINATION AND
USE OF THE INCIDENT REPORTS.
This Court's minute entry indicates it relied entirely on the affidavit of Linda
Wright as the factual basis for its finding that the incident reports are privileged. This
Court stated after referring to statements in that affidavit:
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, this Court
finds that the reports are privileged.
There is absolutely no statement or implication in the minute entry suggesting the
plaintiffs may not try to gather contrary evidence.
This Court had ample opportunity in its minute entry to foreclose any discovery
into the accuracy of Linda Wright's affidavit assertions. It chose not to close the door
on such discovery. On the contrary, the minute entry seems to invite discovery. To

-3-

preclude discovery would be contrary to the compelling case authority cited in plaintiffs'
reply memorandum last December. The training videotape the Hospital uses to train its
personnel in the prevention of patient falls specifically dictates that "all circumstances

and findings [concerning a fall] should be documented in the patient's chart and
on the incident report form." In this instance, it is precisely because the facts and
circumstances surrounding Mr. Cannon's fall are not documented in the patient's chart
that plaintiffs seek production of the incident reports. They should at the least be
allowed to interrogate Linda Wright as to the Hospital's apparent violation of its own
standard concerning documentation of circumstances surrounding patient falls. They
should also be allowed to discover the identity of all persons who have seen the
incident reports.
As the plaintiffs pointed out in their reply memorandum last December, Linda
Wright's affidavit
. . . was crafted in a way to conceal whether the Hospital's
own counsel has had access to the incident reports. If so,
denying access to plaintiffs' counsel would be grossly unfair.
At the very least, the incident reports should have been
produced for the Court's in-camera review. So too should
the Hospital's bylaws, and all rules and protocols pertaining
to patient rights, patient records and the use of information
contained in incident reports.
The Hospital should not be allowed to benefit from a practice of labeling as
privileged information which its own training film unequivocally states should be a part

-4-

of the patient's medical records.

CONCLUSION
This Court has not precluded discovery into the dissemination and use of the
Hospital's incident reports. There is no basis in this Court's minute entry for the
Hospital's conclusion that it has. The Hospital had no right on its own to refuse to
produce Linda Wright and other witnesses possessing information responsive to
plaintiffs'. Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice. The Hospital has filed no motion foFa
protective order. It has simply taken upon itself the role of deciding what can and
cannot be discovered. In doing so, it has violated the rules of discovery and should be
sanctioned.
DATED this 3 -

day of April, 2004.

Douglas G. Mortensen>
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

-5-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the j£__ day of April, 2004,1 caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to be delivered to the following via the means indicated:
Elizabeth L. Wllley
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

/
•
D
D

Pldg Reply mem supporting mtn to compel.0402
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U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand-Delivered
Federal Express

Exhibit K

Douglas G. Mortensen, USB #2329
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801)363-2244
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KATHERYN CANNON, as surviving
spouse of GARY R. CANNON,
deceased, LANE CANNON and
ROLAND CANNON, as surviving children
and legal heirs of GARY R. CANNON,
deceased,

AFFIDAVIT AS TO COSTS
AND ATTORNEYS FEES
Civil No.: 020914614
Judge Judith S. Atherton

Plaintiffs,
vs.
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER, INC., JOHN AND JANE DOES
1 THROUGH X and DOE BUSINESS
ENTITIES 1 THROUGH V,
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Douglas G. Mortensen, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am and at all times material hereto have been counsel for the plaintiffs in

this action. I hold and continuously since 1991 have held an "A V" rating from

Martindale Hubbell. I have been practicing law in Utah for 26 years. I have personal
knowledge of the information contained in this affidavit.
2.

I am familiar with the rates customarily charged by attorneys of my

experience. My hourly rate is $200. That rate is reasonable.
3.

Through the date of the signing of this affidavit, I have spent 3.5 hours in

connection with the motion to compel discovery concerning the assertions of privilege
set forth in Linda Wright's affidavit. My office has to date incurred copying and mailing
costs in connection with that motion of $3.50. The reasonable costs and fees
incurred to date in connection with the motion to compel discovery total $703.50.
4.

To the date of the signing of this affidavit, I have spent some 6.75 hours in

work necessitated by the Hospital's motion for summary judgment. Such work has
included reviewing correspondence and e-mails, consulting the Rules of Procedure,
conducting research, drafting an affidavit pertaining to communications surrounding the
extension of discovery deadlines and drafting and editing a memorandum opposing
summary judgment. My office has to date incurred copying and mailing costs in
connection with that motion of $7.60. The reasonable costs and fees incurred in
connection with opposing the Hospital's summary judgment motion total
$1,357.60.

-2-

DATED this2j£ d^y of March, 2004.

Douglas G. Mortensssn
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Subscribed and sworn to before me this £7

fyL^/lA-

day of March, 2004.

jQj
'J/XU^K&YK

Notary Public

ANNBERUMEN
NOttffiY PUBUC -STATE OP UTAH
648 East 100 South
Satt Late City, UT841C*
My Corom. Exp. 3-30-2008

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ^ Y a a v of March, 2004,1 caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing tofc>©delivered to the following via the means indicated:
Elizabeth L. Willey
Snow, Christensen & M^rtineau
10 Exchange Place, H" 1 Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

D
D

& Xs\AAA

Pldg Affidavit of Costs.0323
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U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand-Delivered
Federal Express

pAJUAfA$A^

